

Global warming in the pipeline

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ABSTRACT

Improved knowledge of glacial-to-interglacial global temperature change implies that fast-feedback equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) is $1.2 \pm 0.3^\circ\text{C}$ (2σ) per W/m^2 , which is $4.8^\circ\text{C} \pm 1.2^\circ\text{C}$ for doubled CO_2 . Consistent analysis of temperature over the full Cenozoic era – including “slow” feedbacks by ice sheets and trace gases – supports this ECS and implies that CO_2 was 300-350 ppm in the Pliocene and about 450 ppm at transition to a nearly ice-free planet, thus exposing unrealistic lethargy of ice sheet models. If today’s atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) levels remain fixed, they will cause equilibrium global warming including slow feedbacks of 10°C , which is reduced to 8°C by today’s human-made aerosols. This “warming in the pipeline” is potential warming, not “committed” warming. Decline of aerosol emissions since 2010 should increase the 1970-2010 global warming rate of 0.18°C per decade to a post-2010 rate of at least 0.27°C per decade. Under the current geopolitical approach to GHG emissions, global warming will likely exceed 1.5°C ceiling in the 2020s and 2°C before 2050. Impacts on people and nature will accelerate as global warming increases hydrologic extremes. The enormity of consequences demands a return to Holocene-level global temperature. Required actions include: 1) a global increasing price on GHG emissions accompanied by development of abundant, affordable, dispatchable clean energy, 2) East-West cooperation in a way that accommodates developing world needs, and 3) intervention with Earth’s radiation imbalance to phase down today’s massive human-made “geo-transformation” of Earth’s climate. These changes will not happen with the current geopolitical approach, but current political crises present an opportunity for reset, especially if young people can grasp their situation.

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30 1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND STRUCTURE OF PAPER

31 It has been known since the 1800s that infrared-absorbing (greenhouse) gases (GHGs) warm
32 Earth's surface and that the abundance of GHGs changes naturally as well as from human
33 actions.^{1,2} Roger Revelle wrote in 1965 that we are conducting a “vast geophysical experiment”
34 by burning fossil fuels that accumulated in Earth's crust over hundreds of millions of years.³
35 Carbon dioxide (CO₂) in the air is now increasing and already has reached levels that have not
36 existed for millions of years, with consequences that have yet to be determined. Jule Charney led
37 a study in 1979 by the United States National Academy of Sciences that concluded that doubling
38 of atmospheric CO₂ was likely to cause global warming of $3 \pm 1.5^\circ\text{C}$.⁴ Charney added:
39 “However, we believe it is quite possible that the capacity of the intermediate waters of the
40 ocean to absorb heat could delay the estimated warming by several decades.”

41 After U.S. President Jimmy Carter signed the 1980 Energy Security Act, which included a focus
42 on unconventional fossil fuels such as coal gasification and rock fracturing (“fracking”) to
43 extract shale oil and tight gas, the U.S. Congress asked the National Academy of Sciences again
44 to assess potential climate effects. Their massive *Changing Climate* report had a measured tone
45 on energy policy – amounting to a call for research.⁵ Was not enough known to caution
46 lawmakers against taxpayer subsidy of the most carbon-intensive fossil fuels? Perhaps the
47 equanimity was due in part to a major error: the report assumed that the delay of global warming
48 caused by the ocean's thermal inertia is 15 years, independent of climate sensitivity. With that
49 assumption, they concluded that climate sensitivity for $2\times\text{CO}_2$ is near or below the low end of
50 Charney's 1.5-4.5°C range. If climate sensitivity was low and the lag between emissions and
51 climate response was only 15 years, climate change would not be nearly the threat that it is.

52 Simultaneous with preparation of *Changing Climate*, climate sensitivity was addressed at the
53 1982 Ewing Symposium at the Lamont Doherty Geophysical Observatory of Columbia
54 University on 25-27 October, with papers published in January 1984 as a monograph of the
55 American Geophysical Union.⁶ Paleoclimate data and global climate modeling together led to an
56 inference that climate sensitivity is in the range 2.5-5°C for $2\times\text{CO}_2$ and that climate response
57 time to a forcing is of the order of a century, not 15 years.⁷ Thus, the concept that a large amount
58 of additional human-made warming is already “in the pipeline” was introduced. E.E. David, Jr.,
59 President of Exxon Research and Engineering, in his keynote talk at the symposium insightfully
60 noted⁸: “The critical problem is that the environmental impacts of the CO₂ buildup may be so
61 long delayed. A look at the theory of feedback systems shows that where there is such a long
62 delay, the system breaks down, unless there is anticipation built into the loop.”

63 Thus, the danger caused by climate's delayed response and the need for anticipatory action to
64 alter the course of fossil fuel development was apparent to scientists and the fossil fuel industry
65 40 years ago.⁹ Yet industry chose to long deny the need to change energy course,¹⁰ and now,
66 while governments and financial interests connive, most industry adopts a “greenwash” approach
67 that threatens to lock in perilous consequences for humanity. Scientists will share responsibility,
68 if we allow governments to rely on goals for future global GHG levels, as if targets had meaning
69 in the absence of policies required to achieve them.

70 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1988 to provide
71 scientific assessments on the state of knowledge about climate change¹¹ and almost all nations
72 agreed to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change¹² with the
73 objective to avert “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The current
74 IPCC Working Group 1 report¹³ provides a best estimate of 3°C for equilibrium global climate
75 sensitivity to 2×CO₂ and describes shutdown of the overturning ocean circulations and large sea
76 level rise on the century time scale as “high impact, low probability” even under extreme GHG
77 growth scenarios. This contrasts with “high impact, high probability” assessments reached in a
78 paper¹⁴ – hereafter abbreviated *Ice Melt* – that several of us published in 2016. Recently, our
79 paper’s first author (JEH) described a long-time effort to understand the effect of ocean mixing
80 and aerosols on observed and projected climate change, which led to a conclusion that most
81 climate models are unrealistically insensitive to freshwater injected by melting ice and that ice
82 sheet models are unrealistically lethargic in the face of rapid, large climate change.¹⁵

83 Eelco Rohling, editor of Oxford Open Climate Change, invited a perspective article on these
84 issues. Our principal motivation in this paper is concern that IPCC has underestimated climate
85 sensitivity and understated the threat of large sea level rise and shutdown of ocean overturning
86 circulations, but these issues, because of their complexity, must be addressed in two steps. Our
87 present paper addresses climate sensitivity and warming in the pipeline, concluding that these
88 exceed IPCC’s best estimates. Response of ocean circulation and ice sheet dynamics to global
89 warming– already outlined in the *Ice Melt* paper – will be addressed further in a later paper.¹⁶

90 The structure of our present paper is as follows. Section 2 (Climate Sensitivity) makes a fresh
91 evaluation of Charney’s equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) based on improved paleoclimate
92 data and introduces Earth system sensitivity (ESS), which includes the feedbacks that Charney
93 held fixed. Section 3 (Climate Response Time) explores the fast-feedback response time of
94 Earth’s temperature and energy imbalance to an imposed forcing, concluding that cloud
95 feedbacks buffer heat uptake by the ocean, thus increasing the delay in surface warming and
96 making Earth’s energy imbalance an underestimate of the forcing reduction required to stabilize
97 climate. Section 4 (Cenozoic Era) analyzes temperature change of the past 66 million years and
98 infers the Cenozoic history of CO₂, thus providing insights about climate change. Section 5
99 (Aerosols) addresses the absence of aerosol forcing data via inferences from paleo data and
100 modern global temperature change, and we point out potential information in “the great
101 inadvertent aerosol experiment” provided by recent restrictions on fuels in international shipping.
102 Section 6 (Summary) discusses policy implications of high climate sensitivity and the delayed
103 response of the climate system. Warming in the pipeline need not appear. We can take actions
104 that slow and reverse global warming; indeed, we suggest that such actions are needed to avoid
105 disastrous consequences for humanity and nature. Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions as
106 rapidly as practical has highest priority, but that policy alone is now inadequate and must be
107 complemented by additional actions to affect Earth’s energy balance. The world is still early in
108 this “vast geophysical experiment” – as far as consequences are concerned – but time has run
109 short for the “anticipation” that E.E. David recommended.

110 **2. CLIMATE SENSITIVITY (ECS AND ESS)**

111 This section gives a brief overview of the history of ECS estimates since the Charney report and
112 uses glacial-to-interglacial climate change to infer an improved estimate of ECS. We discuss
113 how ECS and the more general Earth system sensitivity (ESS) depend on the climate state.

114 Charney defined ECS as the eventual global temperature change caused by doubled CO₂ if ice
115 sheets, vegetation and long-lived GHGs are fixed (except the specified CO₂ doubling). Other
116 quantities affecting Earth's energy balance – clouds, aerosols, water vapor, snow cover and sea
117 ice – change rapidly in response to climate change. Thus, Charney's ECS is also called the “fast-
118 feedback” climate sensitivity. Feedbacks interact in many ways, so their changes are calculated
119 in global climate models (GCMs) that simulate such interactions. Charney implicitly assumed
120 that change of the ice sheets on Greenland and Antarctica – which we categorize as a “slow
121 feedback” – was not important on time scales of most public interest.

122 ECS defined by Charney is a gedanken concept that helps us study the effect of human-made and
123 natural climate forcings. If knowledge of ECS were based only on models, it would be difficult
124 to narrow the range of estimated climate sensitivity – or have confidence in any range – because
125 we do not know how well feedbacks are modeled or if the models include all significant real-
126 world feedbacks. Cloud and aerosol interactions are complex, e.g., and even small cloud changes
127 can have a large effect. Thus, data on Earth's paleoclimate history are essential, allowing us to
128 compare different climate states, knowing that all feedbacks operated.

129 **2.1. Climate sensitivity estimated at the 1982 Ewing Symposium**

130 Climate sensitivity was addressed in our paper⁷ for the Ewing Symposium monograph using the
131 feedback framework implied by E.E. David and employed by electrical engineers.¹⁷ The climate
132 forcing caused by 2×CO₂ – the imposed perturbation of Earth's energy balance – is ~ 4 W/m². If
133 there were no climate feedbacks and Earth radiated energy to space as a perfect black surface,
134 Earth's temperature would need to increase ~ 1.2°C to increase radiation to space 4 W/m² and
135 restore energy balance. However, feedbacks occur in the real world and in GCMs. In our GCM
136 the equilibrium response to 2×CO₂ was 4°C warming of Earth's surface. Thus, the fraction of
137 equilibrium warming due directly to the CO₂ change was 0.3 (1.2°C/4°C) and the feedback
138 “gain,” g, was 0.7 (2.8°C/4°C). Algebraically, ECS and feedback gain are related by

$$139 \text{ECS} = 1.2^\circ\text{C}/(1-g). \quad (1)$$

140 We evaluated contributions of individual feedback processes to g by inserting changes of water
141 vapor, clouds, and surface albedo (reflectivity, literally whiteness, due to sea ice and snow
142 changes) from the 2×CO₂ GCM simulation one-by-one into a one-dimensional radiative-
143 convective model,¹⁸ finding g_{wv} = 0.4, g_{cl} = 0.2, g_{sa} = 0.1, where g_{wv}, g_{cl}, and g_{sa} are the water
144 vapor, cloud and surface albedo gains. The 0.2 cloud gain was about equally from a small
145 increase in cloud top height and a small decrease in cloud cover. These feedbacks all seemed
146 reasonable, but how could we verify their magnitudes or the net ECS due to all feedbacks?

147 We recognized the potential of emerging paleoclimate data. Early data from polar ice cores
148 revealed that atmospheric CO₂ was much less during glacial periods and the CLIMAP project¹⁹

149 used proxy data to reconstruct global surface conditions during the Last Glacial Maximum
150 (LGM), which peaked about 20,000 years ago. A powerful constraint was the fact that Earth had
151 to be in energy balance averaged over the several millennia of the LGM. However, when we
152 employed CLIMAP boundary conditions including sea surface temperatures (SSTs), Earth was
153 out of energy balance, radiating 2.1 W/m^2 to space., i.e., Earth was trying to cool off with an
154 enormous energy imbalance, equivalent to half of $2\times\text{CO}_2$ forcing.

155 Something was wrong with either assumed LGM conditions or our climate model. We tried
156 CLIMAP's maximal land ice – this only reduced the energy imbalance from 2.1 to 1.6 W/m^2 .
157 Moreover, we had taken LGM CO_2 as 200 ppm and did not know that CH_4 and N_2O were less in
158 the LGM than in the present interglacial period; accurate GHGs and CLIMAP SSTs produce a
159 planetary energy imbalance close to 3 W/m^2 . Most feedbacks in our model were set by CLIMAP.
160 Sea ice is set by CLIMAP. Water vapor depends on surface temperature, which is set by
161 CLIMAP SSTs. Cloud feedback is uncertain, but ECS smaller than 2.4°C for $2\times\text{CO}_2$ would
162 require a negative cloud gain. $g_{\text{cl}} \sim 0.2$ from our GCM increases ECS from 2.4°C to 4°C (eq. 1)
163 and accounts for almost the entire difference of sensitivities of our model (4°C for $2\times\text{CO}_2$) and
164 the Manabe and Stouffer model²⁰ (2°C for $2\times\text{CO}_2$) that had fixed cloud cover and cloud height.
165 Manabe suggested²¹ that our higher ECS was due to a too-large sea ice and snow feedback, but
166 we noted⁷ that sea ice in our control run was less than observed, so we likely understated sea ice
167 feedback. Amplifying feedback due to high clouds increasing in height with warming is expected
168 and is found in observations, large-eddy simulations and GCMs.²² Sherwood *et al.*²³ conclude
169 that negative low-cloud feedback is “neither credibly suggested by any model, nor by physical
170 principles, nor by observations.” Despite a wide spread among models, GCMs today show an
171 amplifying cloud feedback due to increases in cloud height and decreases in cloud amount,
172 despite increases in cloud albedo.²⁴ These cloud changes are found in all observed cloud regimes
173 and locations, implying robust thermodynamic control.²⁵

174 CLIMAP SSTs were a more likely cause of the planetary energy imbalance. Co-author D. Peteet
175 used pollen data to infer LGM tropical and subtropical cooling $2\text{-}3^\circ\text{C}$ greater than in a GCM
176 forced by CLIMAP SSTs. D. Rind and Peteet found that montane LGM snowlines in the tropics
177 descended 1 km in the LGM, inconsistent with climate constrained by CLIMAP SSTs. CLIMAP
178 assumed that tiny shelled marine species migrate to stay in a temperature zone they inhabit
179 today. But what if, instead, these species partly adapt over millennia to changing temperature?
180 Based on the work of Rind and Peteet, later published,²⁶ we suspected but could not prove that
181 CLIMAP SSTs were too warm.

182 Based on GCM simulations for $2\times\text{CO}_2$, on our feedback analysis for the LGM, and on observed
183 global warming in the past century, we concluded that ECS was in the range $2.5\text{-}5^\circ\text{C}$ for $2\times\text{CO}_2$.
184 If CLIMAP SSTs were accurate, ECS was near the low end of that range. In contrast, our
185 analysis implied that ECS for $2\times\text{CO}_2$ was in the upper half of the $2.5\text{-}5^\circ\text{C}$ range, but our analysis
186 depended in part on our GCM, which had sensitivity 4°C for $2\times\text{CO}_2$. To resolve the matter, a
187 paleo thermometer independent of biologic adaptation was needed. Several decades later, such a
188 paleo thermometer and advanced analysis techniques exist. We will use recent studies to infer
189 our present best estimates for ECS and ESS. First, however, we will comment on other estimates
190 of climate sensitivity and clarify the definition of climate forcings that we employ.

191 2.2. IPCC and independent climate sensitivity estimates

192 Reviews of climate sensitivity are available, e.g., Rohling *et al.*,²⁷ which focuses on the physics
193 of the climate system, and Sherwood *et al.*,²³ which adds emphasis on probabilistic combination
194 of multiple uncertainties. Progress in narrowing the uncertainty in climate sensitivity was slow in
195 the first five IPCC assessment reports. The fifth assessment report²⁸ (AR5) in 2014 concluded
196 only – with 66% probability – that ECS was in the range 1.5-4.5°C, the same as Charney’s report
197 35 years earlier. The broad spectrum of information on climate change – especially constraints
198 imposed by paleoclimate data – at last affected AR6,¹³ which concluded with 66% probability
199 that ECS is 2.5-4°C, with 3°C as their best estimate (AR6 Fig. TS.6).

200 Sherwood *et al.*²³ combine three lines of evidence: climate feedback studies, historical climate
201 change, and paleoclimate data, inferring $S = 2.6-3.9^\circ\text{C}$ with 66% probability for $2\times\text{CO}_2$, where S
202 is an “effective sensitivity” relevant to a 150-year time scale. They find ECS only slightly larger:
203 2.6-4.1°C with 66% probability. Climate feedback studies, inherently, cannot yield a sharp
204 definition of ECS, as we showed in the cloud feedback discussion above. Earth’s climate system
205 includes amplifying feedbacks that push the gain, g , closer to unity than zero, thus making ECS
206 sensitive to uncertainty in any feedback; the resulting sensitivity of ECS to g prohibits precise
207 evaluation from feedback analysis. Similarly, historical climate change cannot define ECS well
208 because the aerosol climate forcing is unmeasured. Also, forced and unforced ocean dynamics
209 give rise to a pattern effect:²⁹ the geographic pattern of transient and equilibrium temperature
210 changes differ, which affects ECS inferred from transient climate change. These difficulties help
211 explain how Sherwood *et al.*²³ could estimate ECS as only 6% larger than S , an implausible
212 result in view of the ocean’s great thermal inertia. An intercomparison of GCMs run for
213 millennial time scales, LongRunMIP,³⁰ includes 14 simulations of 9 GCMs with runs of 5,000
214 years (or close enough for extrapolation to 5,000 years). Their global warmings at 5,000 years
215 range from 30% to 80% larger than their 150-year responses.

216 Our approach is to compare glacial and interglacial equilibrium climate states. The change of
217 atmospheric and surface forcings can be defined accurately, thus leading to a sharp evaluation of
218 ECS for cases in which equilibrium response is assured. With this knowledge in hand, additional
219 information can be extracted from historical and paleo climate changes.

220 2.3. Climate forcing definitions

221 Attention to climate forcing definitions is essential for quantitative analysis of climate change.
222 However, readers uninterested in radiative forcings may skip this section with little penalty. We
223 describe our climate forcing definition and compare our forcings with those of IPCC. Our total
224 GHG forcing matches that of IPCC within a few percent, but this close fit hides larger
225 differences in individual forcings that deserve attention.

226 Equilibrium global surface temperature change is related to ECS by

$$227 \Delta T_s \sim F \times \text{ECS} = F \times \lambda, \quad (2)$$

228 where λ is a widely used abbreviation of ECS, ΔT_s is the global mean equilibrium surface
229 temperature change in response to climate forcing F , which is measured in W/m^2 averaged over
230 the entire planetary surface. There are alternative ways to define F , as discussed in Chapter 8³¹ of


231 AR5 and in a paper³² hereafter called *Efficacy*. Objectives are to find a definition of F such that
232 different forcing mechanisms of the same magnitude yield a similar global temperature change,
233 but also a definition that can be computed easily and reliably. The first four IPCC reports used
234 adjusted forcing, F_a , which is Earth’s energy imbalance after stratospheric temperature adjusts to
235 presence of the forcing agent. F_a usually yields a consistent response among different forcing
236 agents, but there are exceptions such as black carbon aerosols; F_a exaggerates their impact. Also,
237 F_a is awkward to compute and depends on definition of the tropopause, which varies among
238 models. F_s , the fixed SST forcing (including fixed sea ice), is more robust than F_a as a predictor
239 of climate response,^{32,33} but a GCM is required to compute F_s . In *Efficacy*, F_s is defined as

$$240 \quad F_s = F_o + \delta T_o / \lambda \quad (3)$$

241 where F_o is Earth’s energy imbalance after atmosphere and land surface adjust to the presence of
242 the forcing agent with SST fixed. F_o is not a full measure of the strength of a forcing, because a
243 portion (δT_o) of the equilibrium warming is already present as F_o is computed. A GCM run of
244 about 100 years is needed to accurately define F_o because of unforced atmospheric variability.
245 That GCM run also defines δT_o , the global mean surface air temperature change caused by the
246 forcing with SST fixed. λ is the model’s ECS in $^{\circ}\text{C}$ per W/m^2 . $\delta T_o / \lambda$ is the portion of the total
247 forcing (F_s) that is “used up” in causing the δT_o warming; radiative flux to space increases by
248 $\delta T_o / \lambda$ due to warming of the land surface and global air. The term $\delta T_o / \lambda$ is usually, but not
249 always, less than 10% of F_o . Thus, it is better not to neglect $\delta T_o / \lambda$. IPCC AR5 and AR6 define
250 effective radiative forcing as $\text{ERF} = F_o$. Omission of $\delta T_o / \lambda$ was intentional³¹ and is not an issue if
251 the practice is followed consistently. However, when the forcing is used to calculate global
252 surface temperature response, the forcing to use is F_s , not F_o . It would be useful if both F_o and
253 δT_o were reported for all climate models.

254 A further refinement of climate forcing is suggested in *Efficacy*: effective forcing (F_e) defined by
255 a long GCM run with calculated ocean temperature. The resulting global surface temperature
256 change, relative to that for equal CO_2 forcing, defines the forcing’s efficacy. Effective forcings,
257 F_e , were found to be within a few percent of F_s for most forcing agents, i.e., the results confirm
258 that F_s is a robust forcing. This support is for F_s , not for $F_o = \text{ERF}$, which is systematically
259 smaller than F_s . The Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS) GCM^{34,35} used for CMIP6³⁶
260 studies, which we label the GISS (2020) model,³⁷ has higher resolution ($2^{\circ} \times 2.5^{\circ}$ and 40
261 atmospheric layers) and other changes that yield a moister upper troposphere and lower
262 stratosphere, relative to the GISS model used in *Efficacy*. GHG forcings reported for the GISS
263 (2020) model^{34,35} are smaller than in prior GISS models, a change attributed³⁵ to blanketing by
264 high level water vapor. However, part of the change is from comparison of F_o in GISS (2020) to
265 F_s in earlier models. The $2 \times \text{CO}_2$ fixed SST simulation with the GISS (2020) model yields $F_o =$
266 $3.59 \text{ W}/\text{m}^2$, $\delta T_o = 0.27^{\circ}\text{C}$ and $\lambda = 0.9 \text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}$ per W/m^2 . Thus $F_s = 3.59 + 0.30 = 3.89 \text{ W}/\text{m}^2$, which is
267 only 5.4% smaller than the $F_s = 4.11 \text{ W}/\text{m}^2$ for the GISS model used in *Efficacy*.

268 Our GHG effective forcing, F_e , was obtained in two steps. Adjusted forcings, F_a , were calculated
269 for each gas for a large range of gas amount with a global-mean radiative-convective model that
270 incorporated the GISS GCM radiation code, which uses the correlated k-distribution method³⁸
271 and high spectral resolution laboratory data.³⁹ The F_a are converted to effective forcings (F_e) via
272 efficacy factors (E_a ; Table 1 of *Efficacy*) based on GCM simulations that include the 3-D
273 distribution of each gas. The total GHG forcing is




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275 Fig. 1. IPCC AR6 Annex III greenhouse gas forcing,¹³ which employs F_a for O_3 and F_o for other
276 GHGs, compared with the effective forcing, F_e , from Eq. (4). See discussion in text.

277
$$F_e = F_a(CO_2) + 1.45 F_a(CH_4) + 1.04 F_a(N_2O) + 1.32 F_a(MPTGs + OTGs) + 0.45 F_a(O_3). \quad (4)$$

278 The CH_4 coefficient (1.45) includes the effect of CH_4 on O_3 and stratospheric H_2O , as well as the
279 efficacy (1.10) of CH_4 per se. We assume that CH_4 is responsible for 45% of the O_3 change.⁴⁰
280 Forcing caused by the remaining 55% of the O_3 change is based on IPCC AR6 O_3 forcing ($F_a =$
281 $0.47 W/m^2$ in 2019); we multiply this AR6 O_3 forcing by $0.55 \times 0.82 = 0.45$, where 0.82 is the
282 efficacy of O_3 forcing from Table 1 of *Efficacy*. Thus, the non- CH_4 portion of the O_3 forcing is
283 $0.21 W/m^2$ in 2019. MPTGs and OTGs are Montreal Protocol Trace Gases and Other Trace
284 Gases.⁴¹ A list of these gases and a table of annual forcings since 1992 are [available](#) as well as
285 the [earlier data](#).⁴²

286 The climate forcing from our formulae is slightly larger than IPCC AR6 forcings (Fig. 1). In
287 2019, the final year of AR6 data, our GHG forcing is $4.00 W/m^2$; the AR6 forcing is $3.84 W/m^2$.
288 Our forcing should be larger, because IPCC forcings are F_o for all gases except O_3 , for which
289 they provide F_a (AR6 section 7.3.2.5). Table 1 in *Efficacy* allows accurate comparison: δT_o for
290 $2 \times CO_2$ for the GISS model used in *Efficacy* is $0.22^\circ C$, λ is $0.67^\circ C$ per W/m^2 , so $\delta T_o/\lambda = 0.33$
291 W/m^2 . Thus, the conversion factor from F_o to F_e (or F_s) is $4.11/(4.11-0.33)$. The non- O_3 portion
292 of AR6 2019 forcing ($3.84 - 0.47 = 3.37$) W/m^2 increases to $3.664 W/m^2$. The O_3 portion of the
293 AR6 2019 forcing ($0.47 W/m^2$) decreases to $0.385 W/m^2$ because the efficacy of $F_a(O_3)$ is 0.82.
294 The AR6 GHG forcing in 2019 is thus $\sim 4.05 W/m^2$, expressed as $F_e \sim F_s$, which is $\sim 1\%$ larger
295 than follows from our formulae. This precise agreement is not indicative of the true uncertainty
296 in the GHG forcing, which IPCC AR6 estimates as 10%, thus about $0.4 W/m^2$. We concur with
297 their error estimate and employ it in our ECS uncertainty analysis (Section 6.1).

298 We conclude that the GHG increase since 1750 already produces a climate forcing equivalent to
299 that of $2 \times CO_2$ (our formulae yield $F_e \sim F_s = 4.08 W/m^2$ for 2021 and $4.13 W/m^2$ for 2022; IPCC
300 AR6 has $F_s = 4.14 W/m^2$ for 2021). The human-made $2 \times CO_2$ climate forcing imagined by
301 Charney, Tyndall and other greenhouse giants is no longer imaginary. Humanity is now taking
302 its first steps into the period of consequences. Earth's paleoclimate history helps us assess the
303 potential outcomes.




304
 305 Fig. 2. Antarctic Dome C temperature for past 800 ky from Jouzel *et al.*⁴³ relative to the mean of
 306 the last 10 ky and Dome C CO₂ amount from Luthi *et al.*⁴⁴ (kyBP is kiloyears before present).

307 **2.4. Glacial-to-interglacial climate oscillations**

308 In this section we describe how ice core data help us assess ECS for climate states from glacial
 309 conditions to interglacial periods such as the Holocene, the interglacial period of the past 12,000
 310 years. We discuss climate sensitivity in warmer climates in Section 4 (Cenozoic Era).

311 Air bubbles in Antarctic ice cores – trapped as snow piled up and compressed into ice – preserve
 312 a record of long-lived GHGs for at least 800,000 years. Isotopic composition of the ice provides
 313 a measure of temperature in and near Antarctica.⁴³ Changes of temperature and CO₂ are highly
 314 correlated (Fig. 2). This does not mean that CO₂ is the primal cause of the climate oscillations.
 315 Hays *et al.*⁴⁵ showed that small changes of Earth’s orbit and the tilt of Earth’s spin axis are
 316 pacemakers of the ice ages. Orbital changes alter the seasonal and geographical distribution of
 317 insolation, which affects ice sheet size and GHG amount. Long-term climate is sensitive because
 318 ice sheets and GHGs act as amplifying feedbacks:⁴⁶ as Earth warms, ice sheets shrink, expose a
 319 darker surface, and absorb more sunlight; also, as Earth warms, the ocean and continents release
 320 GHGs to the air. These amplifying feedbacks work in the opposite sense as Earth cools. Orbital
 321 forcings oscillate slowly over tens and hundreds of thousands of years.⁴⁷ The picture of how
 322 Earth orbital changes drive millennial climate change was painted in the 1920s by Milutin
 323 Milankovitch, who built on 19th century hypotheses of James Croll and Joseph Adhémar.
 324 Paleoclimate changes of ice sheets and GHGs are sometimes described as slow feedbacks,⁴⁸ but
 325 their slow change is paced by the Earth orbital forcing; their slow change does not mean that
 326 these feedbacks cannot operate more rapidly in response to a rapid climate forcing.

327 We evaluate ECS by comparing stable climate states before and after a glacial-to-interglacial
 328 climate transition. GHG amounts are known from ice cores and ice sheet sizes are known from
 329 geologic data. This empirical ECS applies to the range of global temperature covered by ice
 330 cores, which we will conclude is about -7°C to $+1^{\circ}\text{C}$ relative to the Holocene. The Holocene is
 331 an unusual interglacial. Maximum melt rate was at 13.2 kyBP, as expected,⁴⁹ and GHG amounts
 332 began to decline after peaking early in the Holocene, as in most interglacials. However, several
 333 ky later, CO₂ and CH₄ increased, raising a question of whether humans were affecting GHGs.
 334 Ruddiman⁵⁰ suggests that deforestation began to affect CO₂ 6500 years ago and rice irrigation
 335 began to affect CH₄ 5,000 years ago. Those possibilities complicate use of LGM-Holocene
 336 warming to estimate ECS. However, sea level, and thus the size of the ice sheets, had stabilized
 337 by 7,000 years ago (Section 5.1). Thus, the millennium centered on 7 kyBP provides a good
 338 period to compare with the LGM. Comparison of the Eemian interglacial (Fig. 2) with the prior
 339 glacial maximum (PGM) has potential for independent assessment.



340
 341 Fig. 3. Dome C temperature (Jouzel *et al.*⁴³) and multi-ice core GHG amounts (Schilt *et al.*).⁵¹
 342 Green bars (1-5, 6.5-7.5, 18-21, 120-126, 137-144 kyBP) are periods of calculations.

343 2.5. LGM-Holocene and PGM-Eemian evaluation of ECS

344 In this section we evaluate ECS by comparing neighboring glacial and interglacial periods when
 345 Earth was in energy balance within less than 0.1 W/m^2 averaged over a millennium. Larger
 346 imbalance would cause temperature or sea level change that did not occur.⁵² Thus, we can assess
 347 ECS from knowledge of atmospheric and surface forcings that maintained these climates.

348 Recent advanced analysis techniques allow improved estimate of paleo temperatures. Tierney *et al.*⁵³
 349 exclude micro biology fossils whose potential to adapt makes them dubious thermometers.
 350 Instead, they use a large collection of geochemical (isotope) proxies for SST in an analysis
 351 constrained by climate change patterns defined by GCMs. They find cooling of 6.1°C (95%
 352 confidence: $5.7\text{-}6.5^\circ\text{C}$) for the interval 23-19 kyBP. A similarly constrained global analysis by
 353 Osman *et al.*⁵⁴ finds LGM cooling at 21-18 kyBP of $7.0 \pm 1^\circ\text{C}$ (95% confidence).⁵⁵ Tierney
 354 (priv. comm.) attributes the difference between the two studies to the broader time interval of the
 355 former study, and concludes that peak LGM cooling was near 7°C .

356 Seltzer *et al.*⁵⁶ use the temperature-dependent solubility of dissolved noble gases in ancient
 357 groundwater to show that land areas between 45°S and 35°N cooled $5.8 \pm 0.6^\circ\text{C}$ in the LGM.
 358 This cooling is consistent with 1 km lowering of alpine snowlines found by Rind and Peteet.²⁶
 359 Land response to a forcing exceeds ocean response, but polar amplification makes the global
 360 response as large as the low latitude land response in GCM simulations with fixed ice sheets (SM
 361 Fig. S3). When ice sheet growth is added, cooling amplification at mid and high latitudes is
 362 greater,⁷ making 5.8°C cooling of low latitude land consistent with global cooling of $\sim 7^\circ\text{C}$.

363 LGM CO_2 , CH_4 and N_2O amounts are known accurately with the exception of N_2O in the PGM
 364 when N_2O reactions with dust in the ice core corrupt the data. We take PGM N_2O as the mean of
 365 the smallest reported PGM amount and the LGM amount; potential error in the N_2O forcing is
 366 $\sim 0.01 \text{ W/m}^2$. We calculate CO_2 , CH_4 , and N_2O forcings using Eq. (4) and formulae for each gas
 367 in Supp. Material for the periods shown by green bars in Fig. 3. The Eemian period avoids early
 368 CO_2 and temperature spikes, assuring that Earth was in energy balance. Between the LGM (19-
 369 21 kyBP) and Holocene (6.5-7.5 kyBP), GHG forcing increased 2.25 W/m^2 with 77% from CO_2 .
 370 Between the PGM and Eemian, GHG forcing increased 2.30 W/m^2 with 79% from CO_2 .

371 Glacial-interglacial aerosol changes are not included as a forcing. Natural aerosol changes, like
 372 clouds, are fast feedbacks. Indeed, aerosols and clouds form a continuum and distinction is
 373 arbitrary as humidity approaches 100 percent. There are many aerosol types, including VOCs
 374 (volatile organic compounds) produced by trees, sea salt produced by wind and waves, black and
 375 organic carbon produced by forest and grass fires, dust produced by wind and drought, and

376 marine biologic dimethyl sulfide and its secondary aerosol products, all varying geographically
377 and in response to climate change. We do not know, or need to know, natural aerosol properties
378 in prior eras because their changes are feedbacks included in the climate response. However,
379 human-made aerosols are a climate forcing (an imposed perturbation of Earth's energy balance).
380 Humans may have begun to affect gases and aerosols in the latter Holocene (Section 5), but we
381 minimize that issue by using the 6.5-7.5 kyBP window to evaluate climate sensitivity.

382 Earth's surface change is the other forcing needed to evaluate ECS: (1) change of surface albedo
383 (reflectivity) and topography by ice sheets, (2) vegetation change, e.g., boreal forests replaced by
384 brighter tundra, and (3) continental shelves exposed by lower sea level. Forcing by all three can
385 be evaluated at once with a GCM. Accuracy requires realistic clouds, which shield the surface.
386 Clouds are the most uncertain feedback.⁵⁷ Evaluation is ideal for CMIP⁵⁸ (Coupled Model
387 Intercomparison Project) collaboration with PMIP⁵⁹ (Paleoclimate Modelling Intercomparison
388 Project); a study of LGM surface forcing could aid GCM development and assessment of climate
389 sensitivity. Sherwood *et al.*²³ review studies of LGM ice sheet forcing and settle on 3.2 ± 0.7
390 W/m^2 , the same as IPCC AR4.⁶⁰ However, some GCMs yield efficacies as low as ~ 0.75 ⁶¹ or
391 even ~ 0.5 ,⁶² likely due to cloud shielding. We found⁷ a forcing of -0.9 W/m^2 for LGM
392 vegetation by using the Koppen⁶³ scheme to relate vegetation to local climate, but we thought the
393 model effect was exaggerated as real-world forests tends to shake off snow albedo effects.
394 Kohler *et al.*⁶⁴ estimate a continental shelf forcing of -0.6 W/m^2 . Based on an earlier study⁶⁵
395 (hereafter *Target CO₂*), our estimate of LGM-Holocene surface forcing is $3.5 \pm 1 \text{ W/m}^2$. Thus,
396 LGM (18-21 kyBP) cooling of 7°C relative to mid-Holocene (7 kyBP), GHG forcing of 2.25
397 W/m^2 , and surface forcing of 3.5 W/m^2 yield an initial ECS estimate $7/(2.25 + 3.5) = 1.22^\circ\text{C}$ per
398 W/m^2 . We discuss uncertainties in Section 6.1.

399 PGM-Eemian global warming provides a second assessment of ECS, one that avoids concern
400 about human influence. PGM-Eemian GHG forcing is 2.3 W/m^2 . We estimate surface albedo
401 forcing as 0.3 W/m^2 less than in the LGM because sea level was about 10 m higher during the
402 PGM.⁶⁶ North American and Eurasian ice sheet sizes differed between the LGM and PGM,⁶⁷ but
403 division of mass between them has little effect on the net forcing (Fig. S4⁶⁵). Thus, our central
404 estimate of PGM-Eemian forcing is 5.5 W/m^2 . Eemian temperature reached about $+1^\circ\text{C}$ warmer
405 than the Holocene,⁶⁸ based on Eemian SSTs of $+0.5 \pm 0.3^\circ\text{C}$ relative to 1870-1889,⁶⁹ or $+0.65 \pm$
406 0.3°C SST and $+1^\circ\text{C}$ global (land plus ocean) relative to 1880-1920. However, the PGM was
407 probably warmer than the LGM; it was warmer at Dome C (Fig.2), but cooler at Dronning Maud
408 Land.⁷⁰ Based on deep ocean temperatures (Section 4), we estimate PGM-Eemian warming as
409 0.5°C greater than LGM-Holocene warming, i.e., 7.5°C . The resulting ECS is $7.5/5.5 = 1.36^\circ\text{C}$
410 per W/m^2 . Although PGM temperature lacks quantification comparable to that of Seltzer *et al.*⁵⁶
411 and Tierney *et al.*⁵³ for the LGM, the PGM-Eemian warming provides support for the high ECS
412 inferred from LGM-Holocene warming.

413 We conclude that ECS for climate in the Holocene-LGM range is $1.2^\circ\text{C} \pm 0.3^\circ\text{C}$ per W/m^2 ,
414 where the uncertainty is the 95% confidence range. The uncertainty estimate is inherently
415 subjective, as it depends mainly on the ice age surface albedo forcing. The GHG forcing and
416 glacial-interglacial temperature change are well-defined, but the efficacy of ice age surface
417 forcing varies among GCMs. This variability is likely related to cloud shielding of surface
418 albedo, which reaffirms the need for a focus on precise cloud observations and modeling.

419 **2.6 State dependence of climate sensitivity**

420 ECS based on glacial-interglacial climate is an average for global temperatures -7°C to $+1^{\circ}\text{C}$
421 relative to the Holocene and in general differs for other climate states because water vapor,
422 aerosol-cloud and sea ice feedbacks depend on the initial climate. However, ECS is rather flat
423 between today's climate and warmer climate, based on a study⁷¹ covering a range of 15 CO_2
424 doublings using an efficient GCM developed by Gary Russell.⁷² Toward colder climate, ice-
425 snow albedo feedback increases nonlinearly, reaching snowball Earth conditions – with snow
426 and ice on land reaching sea level in the tropics – when CO_2 declines to a quarter to an eighth of
427 its 1950 abundance (Fig. 7 of the study).⁷¹ Snowball Earth occurred several times in Earth's
428 history, most recently about 600 million years ago⁷³ when the Sun was 6% dimmer⁷⁴ than today,
429 a forcing of about -12 W/m^2 . Toward warmer climate, the water vapor feedback increases as the
430 tropopause rises,⁷⁵ the tropopause cold trap disappearing at $32\times\text{CO}_2$ (Fig. 7).⁷¹ However, for the
431 range of ECS of practical interest – say from half preindustrial CO_2 to $4\times\text{CO}_2$ – state dependence
432 of ECS is small compared to state dependence of ESS.

433 Earth system sensitivity (ESS) includes amplifying feedbacks of GHGs and ice sheets.⁷⁶ When
434 we consider CO_2 change as a known forcing, other GHGs provide a feedback that is smaller than
435 the ice sheet feedback, but not negligible. Ice core data on GHG amounts show that non- CO_2
436 GHGs – including O_3 and stratospheric H_2O produced by changing CH_4 – provide about 20% of
437 the total GHG forcing, not only on average for the full glacial-interglacial change, but as a
438 function of global temperature right up to $+1^{\circ}\text{C}$ global temperature relative to the Holocene (Fig.
439 S5). Atmospheric chemistry modeling suggests that non- CO_2 GHG amplification of CO_2 forcing
440 by about a quarter continues into warmer climate states.⁷⁷ Thus, for climate change in the
441 Cenozoic era, we approximate non- CO_2 GHG forcing by increasing the CO_2 forcing by one-
442 quarter.

443 Ice sheet feedback, in contrast to non- CO_2 GHG feedback, is highly nonlinear. Preindustrial
444 climate was at most a few halvings of CO_2 from runaway snowball Earth and LGM climate was
445 even closer to that climate state. The ice sheet feedback is reduced as Earth heads toward warmer
446 climate today because already two-thirds of LGM ice has been lost. Yet remaining ice on
447 Antarctica and Greenland constitutes a powerful feedback, which humanity is about to bring into
448 play. We can illuminate that feedback and the climate path Earth is now on by examining data on
449 the Cenozoic era – which includes CO_2 levels comparable to today's amount – but first we must
450 consider climate response time.

451 3. CLIMATE RESPONSE TIME

452 In this section we define response functions for global temperature and Earth’s energy imbalance
453 that help reveal the physics of climate change. Cloud feedbacks amplify climate sensitivity and
454 thus increase eventual heat uptake by the ocean, but cloud feedbacks also have the potential to
455 buffer the rate at which the ocean takes up heat, thus increasing climate response time.

456 Climate response time was surprisingly long in our climate simulations⁷ for the 1982 Ewing
457 Symposium. The e-folding time – the time for surface temperature to reach 63% of its
458 equilibrium response – was about a century. The only published atmosphere-ocean GCM – that
459 of Bryan and Manabe⁷⁸ – had a response time of 25 years, while several simplified climate
460 models referenced in our Ewing paper had even faster responses. The longer response time of
461 our climate model was largely a result of high climate sensitivity – our model had an ECS of 4°C
462 for 2×CO₂ while the Bryan and Manabe model had an ECS of 2°C.

463 The physics is straightforward. If the delay were a result of a fixed source of thermal inertia, say
464 the ocean’s well-mixed upper layer, response time would increase linearly with ECS because
465 most climate feedbacks come into play in response to temperature change driven by the adjusted
466 forcing, not in direct response to the forcing. Thus, a model with ECS of 4°C takes twice as long
467 to reach full response as a model with ECS of 2°C, if the mixed layer provides the only heat
468 capacity. However, while the mixed layer is warming, there is exchange of water with the deeper
469 ocean, which slows the mixed layer warming. The longer response time with high ECS allows
470 more of the ocean to come into play. If mixing into the deeper ocean is approximated as
471 diffusive, surface temperature response time is proportional to the square of climate sensitivity.⁷⁹


472 Slow climate response accentuates need for the “anticipation” that E.E. David, Jr. spoke about. If
473 ECS is 4.8°C (1.2°C per W/m²), more warming is in the pipeline than widely assumed. GHG
474 forcing today already exceeds 4 W/m². Aerosols reduce the net forcing to about 3 W/m², based
475 on IPCC estimates (Section 5), but warming still in the pipeline for 3 W/m² forcing is 2.4°C,
476 exceeding warming realized to date (1.2°C). Slow feedbacks increase the equilibrium response
477 even further (Section 6). Large warmings can be avoided via a reasoned policy response, but
478 definition of effective policies will be aided by an understanding of climate response time.

479 3.1. Temperature response function

480 In the Bjerknes lecture⁸⁰ at the 2008 American Geophysical Union meeting, JEH argued that the
481 ocean in many⁸¹ GCMs had excessive mixing, and he suggested that GCM groups all report the
482 response function of their models – the global temperature change versus time in response to
483 instant CO₂ doubling with the model run long enough to approach equilibrium. The response
484 function characterizes a climate model and enables a rapid estimate of the global mean surface
485 temperature change in response to any climate forcing scenario:

$$486 T_G(t) = \int [dT_G(t)/dt] dt = \int \lambda \times R(t) [dF_e/dt] dt. \quad (5)$$

487 T_G is the Green’s function estimate of global temperature at time t, λ (°C per W/m²) the model’s
488 equilibrium sensitivity, R the dimensionless temperature response function (% of equilibrium



489
 490 Fig. 4. (a) Global mean surface temperature response to instant CO₂ doubling and (b) normalized
 491 response function (percent of final change). Thick lines in Figs. 4 and 5 are smoothed⁸² results.


492 response), and dF_e the forcing change per unit time, dt . Integration over time begins when Earth
 493 is in near energy balance, e.g., in preindustrial time. The response function yields an accurate
 494 estimate of global temperature change for a forcing that does not cause reorganization of ocean
 495 circulation. Accuracy of this approximation for temperature for one climate model is shown in
 496 Chart 15 in the Bjerknes presentation and wider applicability has been demonstrated.⁸³

497 We study ocean mixing effects by comparing two GCMs: GISS (2014)⁸⁴ and GISS (2020),³⁵
 498 both models⁸⁵ described by Kelley *et al.* (2020).³⁴ Ocean mixing is improved in GISS (2020) by
 499 use of a high-order advection scheme,⁸⁶ finer upper-ocean vertical resolution (40 layers), updated
 500 mesoscale eddy parameterization, and correction of errors in the ocean modeling code.³⁴ The
 501 GISS (2020) model has improved variability, including the Madden-Julian Oscillation (MJO), El
 502 Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO), but the spectrum of
 503 ENSO-like variability is unrealistic and its amplitude is excessive, as shown by the magnitude of
 504 oscillations in Fig. 4a. Ocean mixing in GISS (2020) may still be excessive in the North Atlantic,
 505 where the model's simulated penetration of CFCs is greater than observed.⁸⁷

506 Despite reduced ocean mixing, the GISS (2020) model surface temperature response is no faster
 507 than in the GISS (2014) model (Fig. 4b): it takes 100 years to reach within 1/e of the equilibrium
 508 response. Slow response is partly explained by the larger ECS of the GISS (2020) model, which
 509 is 3.5°C versus 2.7°C for the GISS (2014) model, but something more is going on in the newer
 510 model, as exposed by the response function of Earth's energy imbalance.

511 3.2. Earth's energy imbalance (EEI)

512 When a forcing perturbs Earth's energy balance, the imbalance drives warming or cooling to
 513 restore balance. Observed EEI is now of order +1 W/m² (more energy coming in than going
 514 out).⁸⁸ High accuracy of EEI is obtained by tracking ocean warming – the main repository for
 515 excess energy – and adding heat stored in warming continents and heat used in net ice melt.⁸⁸
 516 Heat storage in air adds a small amount. Radiation balance measured from Earth-orbiting
 517 satellites cannot by itself define the absolute imbalance, but, when anchored to an in-situ EEI



518
519 Fig. 5. (a) Earth's energy imbalance (EEI) for 2×CO₂, and (b) EEI normalized response function.

520 value for a sufficient interval (e.g., 10 years), satellite Earth radiation budget observations⁸⁹
521 provide invaluable EEI data on finer temporal and spatial scales than the *in situ* data.

522 After a step-function forcing is imposed, EEI and global surface temperature must each approach
523 a new equilibrium, but EEI does so more rapidly, especially for the GISS (2020) model (Fig. 5).
524 EEI in GISS (2020) needs only a decade to reach within 1/e of full response (Fig. 5b), but global
525 surface temperature requires a century (Fig. 4b). Rapid decline of EEI – to half the forcing in 5
526 years (Fig. 5a) – has practical implications. First, EEI defines the rate heat is pumped into the
527 ocean, so if EEI is reduced, ocean warming is slowed. Second, rapid EEI decline implies that it is
528 wrong to assume that global warming can be stopped by a reduction of climate forcing by the
529 amount of EEI. Instead, the required reduction of forcing is larger than EEI. The difficulty in
530 finding additional reduction in climate forcing of even a few tenths of a W/m² is substantial.⁶⁸
531 Calculations that help quantify this matter are discussed in Supp. Material Sec. SM8.

532 What is the physics behind the fast response of EEI? The 2×CO₂ forcing and initial EEI are both
533 nominally 4 W/m². In the GISS (2014) model, the decline of EEI averaged over the first year is
534 0.5 W/m² (Fig. 5a), a moderate decline that might be largely caused by warming continents and
535 thus increased heat radiation to space. In contrast, EEI declines 1.3 W/m² in the GISS (2020)
536 model (Fig. 5a). Such a huge, immediate decline of EEI implies existence of an ultrafast climate
537 feedback. Climate feedbacks are the heart of climate change and warrant discussion.

538 3.3. Slow, fast and ultrafast feedbacks

539 Charney *et al.*⁴ described climate feedbacks without discussing time scales. At the 1982 Ewing
540 Symposium, water vapor, clouds and sea ice were described as “fast” feedbacks⁷ presumed to
541 change promptly in response to global temperature change, as opposed to “slow” feedbacks or
542 specified boundary conditions such as ice sheet size, vegetation cover, and atmospheric CO₂
543 amount, although it was noted that some specified boundary conditions, e.g., vegetation, in
544 reality may be capable of relatively rapid change.⁷

545 The immediate EEI response (Fig. 5a) implies a third feedback time scale: ultrafast. Ultrafast
546 feedbacks are not a new concept. When CO₂ is doubled, the added infrared opacity causes the

547 stratosphere to cool. Instant EEI upon CO₂ doubling is only $F_i = +2.5 \text{ W/m}^2$, but stratospheric
548 cooling quickly increases EEI to $+4 \text{ W/m}^2$.⁹⁰ All models calculate a similar radiative effect, so it
549 is useful to define an adjusted forcing, F_a , which is superior to F_i as a measure of climate forcing.
550 In contrast, if cloud change – the likely cause of the present ultrafast change – is lumped into the
551 adjusted forcing, each climate model has its own forcing, losing the merit of a common forcing.


552 Kamae *et al.*⁹¹ review rapid cloud adjustment distinct from surface temperature-mediated
553 change. Clouds respond to radiative forcing, e.g., via effects on cloud particle phase, cloud
554 cover, cloud albedo and precipitation.⁹² The GISS (2020) model alters glaciation in stratiform
555 mixed-phase clouds, which increases supercooled water in stratus clouds, especially over the
556 Southern Ocean [Fig. 1 in the GCM description³⁴]. The portion of supercooled cloud water drops
557 goes from too little in GISS (2014) to too much in GISS (2020). Neither model simulates well
558 stratocumulus clouds, yet the models help expose real-world physics that affects climate
559 sensitivity and climate response time. Several models in CMIP6 comparisons find high ECS.⁹²
560 For the sake of revealing the physics, it would be useful if the models defined their temperature
561 and EEI response functions. Model runs of even a decade can define the important part of Figs.
562 4a and 5a. Many short (e.g., 2-year) $2\times\text{CO}_2$ climate simulations with each run beginning at a
563 different point in the model's control run, can define cloud changes to an arbitrary accuracy.

564 **4. CENOZOIC ERA**

565 In this section, we use ocean sediment core data to explore climate change in the past 66 million
566 years. This allows us to study warmer climates that are relevant to human-made climate forcing.

567 High equilibrium climate sensitivity that we have inferred, $\text{ECS} = 1.2^\circ\text{C} \pm 0.3^\circ\text{C}$ per W/m^2 , may
568 affect interpretation of warmer climates. GCMs have difficulty in producing Pliocene warmth,⁹³
569 especially in the Arctic, without large – probably unrealistic – CO₂ amounts. In addition, a
570 coupled GCM/ice sheet model needs 700-840 ppm CO₂ for transition between glaciated and
571 unglaciated Antarctica.⁹⁴ Understanding of these climate states is hampered by uncertainty in the
572 forcings that maintained the climate, as proxy measures of CO₂ have large uncertainty.

573 Theory informs us that CO₂ is the principal control knob on global temperature.⁹⁵ Climate of the
574 past 800,000 years demonstrates (Fig. 2) the tight control. Our aim here is to extract Cenozoic
575 surface temperature history from the deep ocean oxygen isotope $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ and infer Cenozoic CO₂
576 history. Oxygen isotope data has high temporal resolution for the entire Cenozoic, which aids
577 understanding of Cenozoic climate change and resulting implications for future climate. Our CO₂
578 analysis is a complement to proxy CO₂ measurements. Despite progress in estimating CO₂ via
579 carbon isotopes in alkenones and boron isotopes in planktic foraminifera,⁹⁶ there is wide scatter
580 among results and fossil plant stomata suggest smaller CO₂ amounts.⁹⁷



581
 582 Fig. 6. Global deep ocean $\delta^{18}\text{O}$. Black line: Westerhold *et al.* (2020)⁹⁸ data in 5 kyr bins until 34
 583 MyBP and subsequently 2 kyr bins. Green line: Zachos *et al.* (2001)⁴⁷ data at 1 Myr resolution.
 584 Lower left: velocity⁹⁹ of Indian tectonic plate. PETM = Paleocene Eocene Thermal Maximum;
 585 EECO = Early Eocene Climatic Optimum; Oi-1 marks the transition to glaciated Antarctica;
 586 MCO = Miocene Climatic Optimum; NAIP = North Atlantic Igneous Province.

587 4.1. Deep ocean temperature and sea level from $\delta^{18}\text{O}$

588 Glacial-interglacial CO_2 oscillations (Fig. 2) involve exchange of carbon among surface carbon
 589 reservoirs: the ocean, atmosphere, soil and biosphere. Total CO_2 in the reservoirs also can vary,
 590 mainly on longer time scales, as carbon is exchanged with the solid Earth. CO_2 then becomes a
 591 primary agent of long-term climate change, leaving orbital effects as “noise” on larger climate
 592 swings. Oxygen isotopic composition of benthic (deep ocean dwelling) foraminifera shells
 593 provides a starting point for analysis of Cenozoic temperature. Fig. 6 includes the recent high-
 594 resolution record of Westerhold *et al.*⁹⁸ and data of Zachos *et al.*⁴⁷ that have been used for many
 595 studies in the past quarter century. When Earth has negligible ice sheets, $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ (^{18}O amount
 596 relative to a standard), provides an estimate of deep ocean temperature (right scale in Fig. 6)⁴⁷

$$597 T_{\text{do}}(^{\circ}\text{C}) = -4 \delta^{18}\text{O} + 12. \quad (6)$$

598 This equation is used for the early Cenozoic, up to the large-scale glaciation of Antarctica at ~34
 599 MyBP (Oi-1 in Fig. 6). At larger $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ (colder climate), lighter ^{16}O evaporates preferentially from
 600 the ocean and accumulates in ice sheets. In Zachos data, $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ increases by 3 between Oi-1 and
 601 the LGM. Half of this $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ change is due to the 6°C change of deep ocean temperature between
 602 Oi-1 (5°C) and the LGM (-1°C).¹⁰⁰ The other 1.5 of $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ change is presumed to be due to the
 603 ~180 m sea level (SL) change between ice-free Earth and the LGM, with ~60 m from Antarctic

604 ice and 120 m from Northern Hemisphere ice. Thus, as an approximation to extract both SL and
 605 T_{do} from $\delta^{18}O$, Hansen *et al.*⁷¹ assumed that SL rose linearly by 60 m as $\delta^{18}O$ increased from
 606 1.75 to 3.25 and linearly by 120 m as $\delta^{18}O$ increased from 3.25 to 4.75.

607 The Zachos (Z) and Westerhold (W) $\delta^{18}O$ time series differ (Fig. 6) mainly because of different
 608 sites of the sediment cores and the way multiple sites are stacked to obtain a time series for the
 609 full Cenozoic. For example, mid-Holocene (6-8 kyBP) values of $\delta^{18}O$ in the Z and W data sets
 610 are $\delta^{18}O_H^Z = 3.32$ and $\delta^{18}O_H^W = 3.88$. Thus, the Z and W $\delta^{18}O$ time series require separate
 611 equations for sea level (SL) and deep ocean temperature (T_{do}):⁷¹

$$612 \quad SL^Z(m) = 60 - 38.2 (\delta^{18}O - 1.75) \quad (\delta^{18}O < 3.32, \text{ maximum SL} = +60 \text{ m}), \quad (7)$$

$$613 \quad SL^W(m) = 60 - 25.2 (\delta^{18}O - 1.5) \quad (\delta^{18}O < 3.88, \text{ maximum SL} = +60 \text{ m}), \quad (8)$$

$$614 \quad SL^Z(m) = -120 (\delta^{18}O - 3.32)/1.58 \quad (\delta^{18}O > 3.32), \quad (9)$$

$$615 \quad SL^W(m) = -120 (\delta^{18}O - 3.88)/1.42 \quad (\delta^{18}O > 3.88), \quad (10)$$

616 where 1.75 and 1.5 are $\delta^{18}O$ midpoints at the Oi-1 transition for the Z and W data sets. Equations
 617 (9) and (10) are based on $\delta^{18}O_{LGM}^Z = 4.9$ and $\delta^{18}O_{LGM}^W = 5.3$ with SL = 0 today. T_{do} equations
 618 are based on specified Holocene and LGM T_{do} of 1°C ¹⁰¹ and -1°C ,¹⁰⁰ respectively. Coefficients
 619 in the T_{do} equations are calculated as shown by the equation (12) example.

$$620 \quad T_{do}^Z(^\circ\text{C}) = 5 - 2.55 (\delta^{18}O - 1.75) \quad (1.75 < \delta^{18}O < 3.32), \quad (11)$$

$$621 \quad T_{do}^Z(^\circ\text{C}) = 1 - 2 (\delta^{18}O - 3.32)/(4.9 - 3.32) = 1 - 1.27 (\delta^{18}O - 3.32) \quad (3.32 < \delta^{18}O), \quad (12)$$

$$622 \quad T_{do}^W(^\circ\text{C}) = 6 - 2.10 (\delta^{18}O - 1.5) \quad (1.5 < \delta^{18}O < 3.88), \quad (13)$$


$$623 \quad T_{do}^W(^\circ\text{C}) = 1 - 1.41 (\delta^{18}O - 3.88) \quad (3.88 < \delta^{18}O), \quad (14)$$

624 Zachos and Westerhold $\delta^{18}O$, SL and T_{do} for the full Cenozoic, Pleistocene, and the past 800,000
 625 years are graphed in Supp. Material and sea level is compared to data of Rohling *et al.*¹⁰². We
 626 focus on the finer resolution W data. Differences between the W and Z data and interpretation of
 627 those differences are discussed in Section 4.6.

628 **4.2. Cenozoic Ts**

629 In this section we combine the rich detail in T_{do} provided by benthic $\delta^{18}O$ with constraints on the
 630 range of Cenozoic T_S from surface proxies to produce an estimated history of Cenozoic T_S .

631 We expect T_{do} change, which derives from sea surface temperature (SST) at high latitudes where
 632 deepwater forms, to approximate T_S change when T_{do} is not near the freezing point. Global SST
 633 change understates global T_S (land plus ocean) change because land temperature response to a
 634 forcing exceeds SST response,¹⁰³ e.g., the equilibrium global SST response of the GISS (2020)
 635 GCM to $2\times\text{CO}_2$ is 70.6% of the global (land plus ocean) response. However, polar amplification
 636 of the SST response tends to compensate for SST undershoot of global T_S change. Compensation
 637 is nearly exact at latitudes of North Atlantic deepwater formation for $2\times\text{CO}_2$ climate change in
 638 the GISS (2020) climate model (Fig. 7a), but Southern Hemisphere polar amplification does not
 639 fully cover the 60-75°S latitudes where Antarctic bottom water forms.



640

641 Fig. 7. (a) Ratio of ΔSST (latitude) to global T_s change for all ocean and the Atlantic Ocean,
 642 based on equilibrium response (years 4001-4500) in $2\times\text{CO}_2$ simulations of GISS (2020) model.
 643 (b) ΔT , the amount by which T_s change exceeds T_{do} change, based on an exponential fit to the
 644 two data points provided by the Holocene and LGM (see text).

645 As T_{do} nears the freezing point, ice forms, adhering to the Antarctic continent, extending today to
 646 a depth of about 2 km, and also forming floating ice shelves. From the Holocene toward colder
 647 climate, the effect on temperature change is large: T_s declines 7°C between the Holocene and
 648 LGM, but T_{do} declines only 2°C (from 1°C to -1°C). From the Holocene toward hotter climate,
 649 we expect a smaller effect that we quantify by first neglecting the effect and finding how far we
 650 underestimate EECO temperature. Thus, as an initial approximation we assume $\Delta T_s = \Delta T_{\text{do}}$:

651
$$T_s \sim T_{\text{do}} - T_{\text{doH}} + 14^{\circ}\text{C} = T_{\text{do}} + 13^{\circ}\text{C}, \quad (\delta^{18}\text{O} < \delta^{18}\text{O}_{\text{H}}) \quad (15)$$


652 where we take Holocene T_s as 14°C and T_{doH} as 1°C . In this initial approximation, we interpolate
 653 linearly for climate colder than the Holocene, the LGM being $\sim 7^{\circ}\text{C}$ cooler than the Holocene:

654
$$T_s = 14^{\circ}\text{C} - 7^{\circ}\text{C} \times (\delta^{18}\text{O} - \delta^{18}\text{O}_{\text{H}}) / (\delta^{18}\text{O}_{\text{LGM}} - \delta^{18}\text{O}_{\text{H}}). \quad (\delta^{18}\text{O} > \delta^{18}\text{O}_{\text{H}}) \quad (16)$$

655 Resulting EECO (Early Eocene Climatic Optimum) T_s is $\sim 27^{\circ}\text{C}$ (Fig. 8a). As expected, this
 656 initial approximation undershoots EECO T_s , which Zhu *et al.*¹⁰⁴ infer to be 29°C from a proxy-
 657 constrained full-field analysis using a GCM to account for the pattern of temperature change.
 658 Moderate undershoot ($\Delta T = 2^{\circ}\text{C}$) of EECO T_s is consistent with expectation that global warming
 659 of a few degrees would remove Antarctic ice shelves and allow polar amplification to fully cover
 660 regions of deepwater formation. Moreover, ΔT of 2°C at the Holocene and 5°C more between
 661 the Holocene and LGM are fit well by an exponential function between Antarctic glaciation and
 662 the LGM, as needed for ΔT to asymptote at the freezing point (Fig. 7b). Thus, we take T_s as

663
$$T_s = T_{\text{do}} - \Delta T + 15^{\circ}\text{C} = T_{\text{do}} - 0.35(e^{0.8X} - 1) + 15^{\circ}\text{C}, \quad (17)$$

664 where $X = \delta^{18}\text{O} - \delta^{18}\text{O}_{\text{O}_{i-1}}$ and T_s is normalized to 14°C in the Holocene.



665
 666 Fig. 8. Cenozoic temperature based on linear (equations 15 and 16) and nonlinear (equation 17)
 667 analyses. Antarctic Dome C data⁴³ (red) relative to last 1,000 years are multiplied by 0.6 to
 668 account for polar amplification and 14°C is added for absolute scale.

669 The result is a consistent analysis of global T_s for the entire Cenozoic (Fig. 8b). Oxygen isotope
 670 $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ of deep ocean foraminifera reproduces glacial-interglacial temperature change well; more
 671 detailed agreement is not expected as Antarctic ice core data are for a location that moves,
 672 especially in altitude. Our interest is in warmer global climate and its relevance to upcoming
 673 human-caused climate change. For that purpose, we want to know the forcing that drove
 674 Cenozoic climate change. With the assumption that non- CO_2 GHG forcings provide 20% of the
 675 total GHG forcing, it is not difficult to infer the CO_2 abundance required to cause the Cenozoic
 676 temperature history in Fig. 8b. Considering the large disagreement among proxy CO_2 measures,
 677 this indirect measure of CO_2 via global T_s may provide the most accurate Cenozoic CO_2 history.

678 4.3. Cenozoic CO_2


679 We obtain the CO_2 history required to yield the Cenozoic T_s history from the relation

$$680 \Delta F(t) = (T_s(t) - 14^\circ\text{C})/\text{ECS}, \quad (18)$$

681 where $\Delta F(t)$ (0 at 7 kyBP) includes changing solar irradiance and amplification of CO_2 forcing
 682 by non- CO_2 GHGs and ice sheets. The GHG amplification factor is taken as 1.25 throughout the
 683 Cenozoic (Section 2.6). The amplification applies to solar forcing as well as CO_2 forcing because
 684 it is caused by temperature change, not by CO_2 . Solar irradiance is increasing 10% per billion
 685 years;⁷⁴ thus solar forcing (240 W/m^2 today) increases 2.4 W/m^2 per 100 million years. Thus,

$$686 \Delta F(t) = 1.25 \times [\Delta F_{\text{CO}_2}(t) + \Delta F_{\text{Sol}}(t)] \times A_s. \quad (\delta^{18}\text{O} > \delta^{18}\text{O}_H) \quad (19)$$

687 A_s , surface albedo amplification, is smaller in moving from the Holocene to warmer climate –
 688 when the main effect is shrinking of Antarctic ice – than toward colder climate. For $\delta^{18}\text{O} >$
 689 $\delta^{18}\text{O}_H$, we take A_s as its average value over the period from the Holocene to the LGM:



690
 691 Fig. 9. Cenozoic CO₂ estimated from δ¹⁸O of Westerhold *et al.* (see text). Black lines are for
 692 ECS = 1.2°C per W/m²; red and green curves (ECS = 1.0 and 1.4°C per W/m²) are 1 My
 693 smoothed. Blue curves (last 800,000 years) are Antarctica ice core data.⁴⁴

694 $A_S = (F_{ice} + F_{GHG})/F_{GHG} = (3.5 \text{ W/m}^2 + 2.25 \text{ W/m}^2)/(2.25 \text{ W/m}^2) = 2.55. (\delta^{18}\text{O} > \delta^{18}\text{O}_H) \quad (20)$

695 Thus, for climate colder than the Holocene,

696 $\Delta F(t) = 3.19 \times [\Delta F_{CO_2}(t) + \Delta F_{Sol}(t)]. \quad (\delta^{18}\text{O} > \delta^{18}\text{O}_H) \quad (21)$

697 For climate warmer than the Holocene up to Oi-1, i.e., for $\delta^{18}\text{O}_{Oi-1} < \delta^{18}\text{O} < \delta^{18}\text{O}_H$,


698 $\Delta F(t) = 1.25 \times [\Delta F_{CO_2}(t) + \Delta F_{SOL}(t) + F_{IceH} \times (\delta^{18}\text{O}_H - \delta^{18}\text{O})/(\delta^{18}\text{O}_H - \delta^{18}\text{O}_{Oi-1})]. \quad (22)$

699 F_{IceH} , the (Antarctic plus Greenland) ice sheet forcing between the Holocene and Oi-1, is
 700 estimated to be 2 W/m² (Fig. S4, *Target CO₂*). For climate warmer than Oi-1

701 $\Delta F(t) = 1.25 \times [\Delta F_{CO_2} + \Delta F_{Sol}(t) + \Delta F_{IceH}]. \quad (23)$

702 All quantities are known except $\Delta F_{CO_2}(t)$, which is thus defined. Cenozoic CO₂ (t) for specified
 703 ECS is obtained from $T_S(t)$ using the CO₂ radiative forcing equation (Table 1, Supp. Material).
 704 Resulting CO₂ (Fig. 9) is about 1,200 ppm at the EECO, 450 ppm at Oi-1, and 325 ppm in the
 705 Pliocene for ECS = 1.2°C per W/m². For ECS = 1°C – about as low as we believe plausible --
 706 Pliocene CO₂ is near 350 ppm, rising only to ~ 500 ppm at Oi-1 and ~ 1500 ppm at EECO.

707 Assumed Holocene CO₂ amount is also a minor factor. We tested two cases: 260 and 278 ppm
 708 (Fig. 9). These were implemented as the CO₂ values at 7 kyBP, but Holocene-mean values are
 709 similar – a few ppm less than CO₂ at 7 kyBP. Holocene = 278 ppm increases CO₂ about 20 ppm
 710 between today and Oi-1, and about 50 ppm at the EECO. However, Holocene CO₂ 278 ppm
 711 causes the amplitude of inferred glacial-interglacial CO₂ oscillations to be less than reality (Fig.
 712 9b), providing support for the Holocene 260 ppm level and for the interpretation that high late-



713


714 Fig. 10. Continental configuration 56 MyBP.¹⁰⁵ Continental shelves (light blue) were underwater
 715 as little water was locked in ice. The Indian plate was moving north at about 15 cm per year.

716 Holocene CO₂ was due to human influence. Proxy measures of Cenozoic CO₂ yield a notoriously
 717 large range. A recent review⁹⁶ constructs a CO₂ history with Loess-smoothed CO₂ ~ 700-1100
 718 ppm at Oi-1. That high Oi-1 CO₂ amount is not plausible without overthrowing the concept that
 719 global temperature is a response to climate forcings. More generally, we conclude that actual
 720 CO₂ during the Cenozoic was near the low end of the range of proxy measurements.

721 4.4. Interpretation of Cenozoic T_s and CO₂

722 In this section we consider Cenozoic T_s and CO₂ histories, which are rich in insights about
 723 climate change with implications for future climate.

724 In *Target CO₂*⁶⁵ and elsewhere¹⁰⁶ we argue that the broad sweep of Cenozoic temperature is a
 725 result of plate tectonic (popularly “continental drift”) effects on CO₂. Solid Earth sources and
 726 sinks of CO₂ are not balanced at any given time. CO₂ is removed from surface reservoirs by: (1)
 727 chemical weathering of rocks with deposition of carbonates on the ocean floor, and (2) burial of
 728 organic matter.^{107,108} CO₂ returns via metamorphism and volcanic outgassing at locations where
 729 oceanic crust is subducted beneath moving continental plates. The interpretation in *Target CO₂*
 730 was that the main Cenozoic source of CO₂ was associated with the Indian plate (Fig. 10), which
 731 separated from Pangea in the Cretaceous^{109,110} and moved through the Tethys (now Indian)
 732 Ocean at a rate exceeding 10 cm/year until collision with the Eurasian plate at circa 50 MyBP.
 733 Associated CO₂ emissions include those from formation of the Deccan Traps¹¹¹ in western India
 734 (a large igneous province, LIP, formed by repeated deposition of large-scale flood basalts), the
 735 smaller Rajahmundry Traps¹¹² in eastern India, and metamorphism and vulcanism associated
 736 with the moving Indian plate. The Indian plate slowed circa 60 Mya (inset, Fig. 6) before
 737 resuming high speed,⁹⁹ leaving an indelible signature in the Cenozoic δ¹⁸O history (Fig. 6) that
 738 supports our interpretation of the CO₂ source. Since the continental collision, subduction and
 739 CO₂ emissions continue at a diminishing rate as the India plate underthrusts the Asian continent
 740 and pushes up the Himalayan mountains.¹¹³ We interpret the decline of CO₂ over the past 50
 741 million years as, at least in part, a decline of the metamorphic source from continued subduction



742 Fig. 11. Climate forcings and slow feedbacks relative to 7 kyBP from terms in equations (21-23).
 743

744 of the Indian plate, but burial of organic matter and increased weathering due to exposure of
 745 fresh rock by Himalayan uplift¹¹⁴ may contribute to CO₂ drawdown. Quantitative understanding
 746 of these processes is limited,¹¹⁵ e.g., weathering is both a source and sink of CO₂.¹¹⁶

747 This picture for the broad sweep of Cenozoic CO₂ is consistent with current understanding of the
 748 long-term carbon cycle,¹¹⁷ but relative contributions of metamorphism¹¹⁵ and volcanism¹¹⁸ are
 749 uncertain. Also, emissions from rift-induced Large Igneous Provinces (LIPs)^{119,120} contribute to
 750 long-term change of atmospheric CO₂, with two cases prominent in Fig. 6. The Columbia River
 751 Flood Basalt at ca. 17-15 MyBP was a principal cause of the Miocene Climatic Optimum,¹²¹ but
 752 the processes are poorly understood.¹²² A more dramatic event occurred as Greenland separated
 753 from Europe, causing a rift in the sea floor; flood basalt covered more than a million square
 754 kilometers with magma volume 6-7 million cubic kilometers¹²⁰ – the North Atlantic Igneous
 755 Province (NAIP). Flood basalt volcanism occurred during 60.5-54.5 MyBP, but at 56.1 ± 0.5
 756 MyBP melt production increased by more than a factor of 10, continued at a high level for about
 757 a million years, and then subsided (Fig. 5 of Storey *et al.*).¹²³ The striking Paleocene-Eocene
 758 Thermal Maximum (PETM) δ¹⁸O spike (Fig. 6) occurs early in this million-year bump-up of
 759 δ¹⁸O. Svensen *et al.*¹²⁴ proposed that the PETM was initiated by the massive flood basalt into
 760 carbon-rich sedimentary strata. Gutjahr *et al.*¹²⁵ developed an isotope analysis, concluding that
 761 most of PETM carbon emissions were volcanic, with climate-driven carbon feedbacks playing a
 762 lesser role. Yet other evidence,¹²⁶ while consistent with volcanism as a trigger for the PETM,
 763 suggests that climate feedback – perhaps methane hydrate release – may have caused more than
 764 half of the PETM warming. Berndt *et al.*¹²⁷ describe extensive shallow-water vents that likely
 765 released CH₄ as well as CO₂ during the NAIP activity. We discuss PETM warming and CO₂
 766 levels below, but first we must quantify the mechanisms that drove Cenozoic climate change and
 767 consider where Earth's climate was headed before humanity intervened.

768 The sum of climate forcings (CO₂ and solar) and slow feedbacks (ice sheets and non-CO₂ GHGs)
 769 that maintained EECO warmth was 12.5 W/m² (Fig. 11). CO₂ forcing of 9.1 W/m² combined
 770 with solar forcing of -1.2 W/m² to yield a total forcing¹²⁸ 8 W/m². Slow feedbacks were 4.5
 771 W/m² forcing (ice albedo = 2 W/m² and non-CO₂ GHGs = 2.5 W/m²). With today's solar


772 irradiance, human-made GHG forcing required for Earth to return to EECO warmth is 8 W/m^2 .
773 Present human-made GHG forcing is 4.6 W/m^2 relative to 7 kyBP.¹²⁹ Equilibrium response to
774 this forcing includes the 2 W/m^2 ice sheet feedback and 25% amplification (of 6.6 W/m^2) by
775 non-CO₂ GHGs, yielding a total forcing plus slow feedbacks of 8.25 W/m^2 . Thus, equilibrium
776 global warming for today's GHGs is 10°C .¹³⁰ If human-made aerosol forcing is -1.5 W/m^2 and
777 remains at that level indefinitely, equilibrium warming for today's atmosphere is reduced to 8°C .
778 Either 10°C or 8°C dwarfs observed global warming of 1.2°C to date. Most of the equilibrium
779 warming for today's atmosphere has not yet occurred, and need not occur (Section 6.5).

780 **4.5 Prospects for another Snowball Earth**

781 We would be remiss if we did not comment on the precipitous decline of Earth's temperature
782 over the last several million years. Was Earth falling off the table into another Snowball Earth?

783 Global temperature plummeted in the past 50 million years, with growing, violent, oscillations
784 (Figs. 6 and 7). Glacial-interglacial average CO₂ declined from about 325 ppm to 225 ppm in the
785 past five million years in an accelerating decline (Fig. 9a). As CO₂ fell to 180 ppm during recent
786 glacial maxima, an ice sheet covered most of Canada and reached midlatitudes in the U.S.
787 Continents in the current supercontinent cycle¹⁰⁹ are now dispersed, with movement slowing to
788 2-3 cm/year. Emissions from the last high-speed high-impact tectonic event – collision of the
789 Indian plate with Eurasia – are fizzling out. The most recent large igneous province (LIP) event –
790 the Columbia River Flood Basalt about 15 million years ago (Fig. 6) – is no longer a factor, and
791 there is no evidence of another impending LIP. Snowball conditions are possible, even though
792 the Sun's brightness is increasing and is now almost 6% greater⁷⁴ than it was at the last snowball
793 Earth, almost 600 million years ago.⁷³ Runaway snowball likely requires only 1-2 halvings⁷¹ of
794 CO₂ from the LGM 180 ppm level, i.e., to 45-90 ppm. Although the weathering rate declines in
795 colder climate,¹³¹ weathering and burial of organic matter continue, so decrease of atmospheric
796 CO₂ could have continued over millions of years, if the source of CO₂ from metamorphism and
797 vulcanism continued to decline.

798 Thus, in the absence of human activity, Earth may have been headed for snowball Earth
799 conditions within the next 10 or 20 million years. However, the chance of future snowball Earth
800 is now academic. Human-made GHG emissions remove that possibility on any time scale of
801 practical interest. Instead, GHG emissions are now driving Earth toward much warmer climate.
802



803
 804 Fig. 12. Temperature and CO₂ implied by Westerhold *et al.* (2020)⁹⁸ δ¹⁸O, if surface warming
 805 equaled deep ocean warming. In reality, the unique PETM event had surface warming ~ 5.6°C,
 806 which implies a peak PETM CO₂ of about 1630 ppm (see text).

807 4.6. Paleocene Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM)

808 The PETM event provides a benchmark for assessing the potential impact of the human-made
 809 climate forcing and the time scale for natural recovery of the climate system.

810 Westerhold⁹⁸ data have 10°C deep ocean warming at the PETM (Figs. 8 and 12a), which exceeds
 811 proxy-derived surface warming. Low latitude SST data have 3–4°C PETM warming.¹³² Tierney
 812 *et al.*¹³³ obtain PETM global surface warming 5.6°C (5.4–5.9°C, 95% confidence) via analysis of
 813 proxy surface temperature data that accounts for patterns of temperature change. Zachos⁴⁷ data
 814 have a deep ocean warming similar to the proxy-based surface warming. These warming
 815 estimates can be reconciled, but first let's note the practical importance of the PETM.

816 Pre-PETM (56–56.4 MyBP) CO₂ is 910 ppm in our analysis for the most likely ECS (1.2°C per
 817 W/m²). Peak PETM CO₂ required to yield the 5.6°C global surface warming estimate of Tierney
 818 *et al.*¹³³ is then 1630 ppm if CO₂ provides 80% of the GHG forcing, thus less than a doubling of
 819 CO₂. (In the unlikely case that CO₂ caused 100% of the GHG forcing, required CO₂ is 1780, not
 820 quite a doubling.) CO₂ amounts for ECS = 1.0 and 1.4°C per W/m² are 1165 and 760 ppm in the
 821 pre-PETM and 2260 and 1270 ppm at peak PETM, respectively. In all these ECS cases, the CO₂
 822 forcing of the PETM is less than or about a CO₂ doubling. Our assumed 20% contribution by
 823 non-CO₂ GHGs (amplification factor 1.25, Section 2), is nominal; Hopcroft *et al.*, e.g., estimate a
 824 30% contribution from non-CO₂ GHGs,¹³⁴ thus an amplification factor 1.43.

825 Thus, today's human-made GHG forcing (4.6 W/m², growing 0.5 W/m² per decade) is already at
 826 least comparable to the PETM forcing, although the net human-made forcing including aerosols
 827 has probably not reached the PETM forcing. However, there are two big differences between the
 828 PETM and today. First, there were no large ice sheets on Earth in the PETM era. Ice sheets on
 829 Antarctica and Greenland today make Earth system sensitivity (ESS) greater than it was during
 830 the PETM. Equilibrium response to today's GHG climate forcing would include deglaciation of
 831 Antarctica and Greenland, sea level rise of 60 m (200 feet), and surface albedo forcing (slow
 832 feedback) of 2 W/m². The second difference between the PETM and today is the rate of change
 833 of the climate forcing. Most of today's climate forcing was introduced in a century, which is 10
 834 times or more faster than the PETM forcing growth. Although a bolide impact¹³⁵ has been
 835 proposed as a trigger for the PETM, the issue is the time scale on which the climate forcing –


836 increased GHGs – occurred. Despite uncertainty in the carbon source(s), data and modeling point
837 to duration of a millennium or more for PETM emissions^{132,136}

838 Better understanding of the PETM could inform us on climate feedbacks. Gutjahr *et al.*¹²⁵ argue
839 persuasively that PETM emissions were mostly volcanic, yet we know of no other large igneous
840 province that produced such great, temporally-isolated, emissions. Further, Cenozoic orbitally-
841 driven hyperthermal events¹³⁷ testify to large CO₂ feedbacks. Northern peatlands today contain
842 more than 1000 Gt carbon,¹³⁸ much of which can be mobilized at PETM warming levels.¹³⁹ The
843 double peak in deep ocean $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ (thus in temperature, cf. Fig. 12, where each square is a binning
844 interval of 5,000 years) is also found in terrestrial data.¹⁴⁰ Perhaps the sea floor rift occurred in
845 two bursts, or the rift was followed tens of thousands of years later by methane hydrate release as
846 a feedback to the ocean warming; much of today's methane hydrate is in stratigraphic deposits
847 hundreds of meters below the sea floor, where millennia may pass before a thermal wave from
848 the surface reaches the deposits.¹⁴¹ Feedback emissions, especially from permafrost, seem to be
849 more chronic than catastrophic, but stabilization of climate may require cooling that terminates
850 growth of those feedbacks (Section 6). The PETM provides perhaps the best empirical check on
851 understanding of the atmospheric lifetime of fossil fuel CO₂,¹⁴² but for that purpose we must
852 untangle as well as possible the time dependence of the PETM CO₂ source and feedbacks. If
853 continuing magma flow or a slow-release feedback is a substantial portion of PETM CO₂, the
854 CO₂ lifetime inferred from post-PETM CO₂ recovery may be an exaggeration.

855 The PETM draws attention to differences between the Westerhold (W) and Zachos (Z) $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ data.
856 Zachos attributes the larger PETM response in W data to the shallow (less than 1 km) depth of
857 the Walvis Ridge core in the Southeast Atlantic that anchors the PETM period in the W data
858 (see Supp. Material SM9). Given that the PETM was triggered by a rift in the floor of the North
859 Atlantic and massive lava injection, it is not surprising that ocean temperature was elevated and
860 circulation disrupted during the PETM. Nunes and Norris¹⁴³ conclude that ocean circulation
861 changed at the start of the PETM with a shift in location of deep-water formation that delivered
862 warmer waters to the deep sea, a circulation change that persisted at least 40,000 years. With
863 regard to differences in the early Cenozoic, Zachos notes (Supp. Material SM9) a likely bias in
864 the Z data with a heavy weighting of data from Southern Ocean sites (Kerguelen Plateau and
865 Maud Rise), which were intended for study of climate of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean.

866 Differences between the W and Z data sets have limited effect on our paper, as we apply separate
867 scaling (equations 7-14) to W and Z data to match observations at the LGM, mid-Holocene, and
868 Oi-1 points. This approach addresses, e.g., the cumulative effect in combining data splices noted
869 by Zachos in SM9. Further, we set the EECO global temperature relative to the Holocene and the
870 PETM temperature relative to pre-PETM based on proxy-constrained, full-field, GCM analyses
871 of Tierney *et al.*¹³³ and Zhu *et al.*¹⁰⁴ Nevertheless, there is much to learn from more precise study
872 of the Cenozoic in general and the PETM in particular.

873 Policy implications require first an understanding of the role of aerosols in climate change.



874

875 Fig. 13. Observed global surface temperature (black line) and expected GHG warming with two
 876 choices for ECS. The blue area is the estimated aerosol cooling effect. The temperature peak in
 877 the World War II era is in part an artifact of inhomogeneous ocean data in that period.⁶⁸

878 5. AEROSOLS


879 The role of aerosols in climate change is uncertain because aerosol properties are not measured
 880 well enough to define their climate forcing. In this section we estimate aerosol climate forcing
 881 via aerosol effects on Earth’s temperature and Earth’s energy imbalance.

882 Aerosol impact is suggested by the gap between observed global warming and expected warming
 883 due to GHGs based on ECS inferred from paleoclimate (Fig. 13). Expected warming is from Eq.
 884 5 with the normalized response function of the GISS (2020) model. Our best estimate for ECS,
 885 $1.2^{\circ}\text{C per W/m}^2$, yields a gap of 1.5°C between expected and actual warming in 2022. Aerosols
 886 are the likely cooling source. The other negative forcing discussed by IPCC – surface albedo
 887 change – is estimated by IPCC (Chapter 7, Table 7.8) to be $-0.12 \pm 0.1 \text{ W/m}^2$, an order of
 888 magnitude smaller than aerosol forcing.¹³ Thus, for clarity, we focus on GHGs and aerosols.

889 Absence of global warming over the period 1850-1920 (Fig. SPM.1 of IPCC AR6 WG1 report¹³)
 890 is a clue about aerosol forcing. GHG forcing increased 0.54 W/m^2 in 1850-1920, which causes
 891 expected warming $0.3\text{-}0.4^{\circ}\text{C}$ by 1920 for $\text{ECS} = 1.2^{\circ}\text{C per W/m}^2$ (Eq. 5). Natural forcings – solar
 892 irradiance and volcanoes – may contribute to lack of warming, but a persuasive case for the
 893 required forcing has not been made. Human-made aerosols are the likely offset of GHG
 894 warming. Such aerosol cooling is a Faustian bargain¹⁰⁶ because payment in enhanced global
 895 warming will come due once we can no longer tolerate the air pollution. Ambient air pollution
 896 causes millions of deaths per year, with particulates most responsible.^{144,145}

897 5.1. Evidence of aerosol forcing in the Holocene


898 In this section we infer evidence of human-made aerosols in the last half of the Holocene from
 899 the absence of global warming. Some proxy-based analyses¹⁴⁶ report cooling in the last half of
 900 the Holocene, but a recent analysis⁵⁴ that uses GCMs to overcome spatial and temporal biases in
 901 proxy data finds rising global temperature in the first half of the Holocene followed by nearly




902
 903 Fig. 14. Global mean surface temperature change over the past 24 ky, reproduced from Fig. 2 of
 904 Osman et al.⁵⁴ including Last Millennium reanalysis of Tardif *et al.*¹⁴⁷

905 constant temperature in the last 6,000 years until the last few centuries (Fig. 14). Antarctic, deep
 906 ocean, and tropical sea surface data all show stable temperature in the last 6,000 years (Fig. S6 of
 907 reference⁶⁵). GHG forcing increased 0.5 W/m^2 during those 6,000 years (Fig. 15), yet Earth did
 908 not warm. Fast feedbacks alone should yield at least $+0.5^\circ\text{C}$ warming and 6,000 years is long
 909 enough for slow feedbacks to also contribute. How can we interpret the absence of warming?

910 Humanity's growing footprint deserves scrutiny. Ruddiman's suggestion that deforestation and
 911 agriculture began to affect CO_2 6500 year ago and rice agriculture began to affect CH_4 5,000
 912 years ago has been criticized⁵⁰ mainly because of the size of proposed sources. Ruddiman sought
 913 sources sufficient to offset declines of CO_2 and CH_4 in prior interglacial periods, but such large
 914 sources are not needed to account for Holocene GHG levels. Paleoclimate GHG decreases are
 915 slow feedbacks that occur in concert with global cooling. However, if global cooling did not
 916 occur in the past 6,000 years, feedbacks did not occur. Earth orbital parameters 6,000 years ago
 917 kept the Southern Ocean warm, as needed to maintain strong overturning ocean circulation¹⁴⁸
 918 and minimize carbon sequestration in the deep ocean. Maximum insolation at 60°S was in late-



919
 920 Fig. 15. GHG climate forcing in past 20 ky with vertical scale expanded for the past 10 ky on the
 921 right. GHG amounts are from Schilt *et al.*⁵¹ and formulae for forcing are in Supporting Material.



922

923 Fig. 16. Sea level since the last glacial period relative to present. Credit: Robert Rohde¹⁴⁹


924 spring (mid-November); since then, maximum insolation at 60°S slowly advanced through the
 925 year, recently reaching mid-summer (mid-January, Fig. 26b of *Ice Melt*¹⁴). Maximum insolation
 926 from late-spring through mid-summer is optimum to warm the Southern Ocean and promote
 927 early warm-season ice melt, which reduces surface albedo and magnifies regional warming.⁴⁸

928 GHG forcing of -0.2 W/m^2 in 10-6 kyBP (Fig. 15) was exceeded by forcing of $+1 \text{ W/m}^2$ due to
 929 ice sheet shrinkage (Supp. Material in *Target CO₂*⁶⁵) for a 40 m sea level rise (Fig. 16). Net 0.8
 930 W/m^2 forcing produced expected 1°C global warming (Fig. 14). The mystery is the absence of
 931 warming in the past 6,000 years. Hansen *et al.*⁴⁸ suggested that aerosol cooling offset GHG
 932 warming. Growing population, agriculture and land clearance produced aerosols and CO_2 ; wood
 933 was the main fuel for cooking and heating. Nonlinear aerosol forcing is largest in a pristine
 934 atmosphere, so it is unsurprising that aerosols tended to offset CO_2 warming as civilization
 935 developed. Hemispheric differences could provide a check. GHG forcing is global, while aerosol
 936 forcing is mainly in the Northern Hemisphere. Global offset implies a net negative Northern
 937 Hemisphere forcing and positive Southern Hemisphere forcing. Thus, data and modeling studies
 938 (including orbital effects) of regional response are warranted but beyond the scope of this paper.

939 5.2. Industrial era aerosols

940 Scientific advances often face early resistance from other scientists.¹⁵⁰ Examples are the
 941 snowball Earth hypothesis¹⁵¹ and the role of an asteroid impact in extinction of non-avian
 942 dinosaurs,¹⁵² which initially were highly controversial but are now more widely accepted.
 943 Ruddiman's hypothesis, right or wrong, is still controversial. Thus, we minimize this issue by
 944 showing aerosol effects with and without preindustrial human-made aerosols.

945 Global aerosols are not monitored with detail needed to define aerosol climate forcing.^{153,154}
 946 IPCC¹³ estimates forcing (Fig. 17a) from assumed precursor emissions, a herculean task due to
 947 many aerosol types and complex cloud effects. Aerosol forcing uncertainty is comparable to its
 948 estimated value (Fig. 17a), which is constrained more by observed global temperature change
 949 than by aerosol measurements.¹⁵⁵ IPCC's best estimate of aerosol forcing (Fig. 17) and GHG



950
 951 Fig. 17. (a) Estimated greenhouse gas and aerosol forcings relative to 1750 values. (b) Aerosol forcing as
 952 percent of GHG forcing. Forcings for dark blue area are relative to 1750. Light blue area adds 0.5 W/m²
 953 forcing estimated for human-caused aerosols from fires, biofuels and land use.

954 history define the percent of GHG forcing offset by aerosol cooling – the dark blue area in Fig.
 955 17b. However, if human-made aerosol forcing was -0.5 W/m^2 by 1750, offsetting $+0.5 \text{ W/m}^2$
 956 GHG forcing, this forcing should be included. Such aerosol forcing – largely via effects of land
 957 use and biomass fuels on clouds – continues today. Thirty million people in the United States use
 958 wood for heating.¹⁵⁶ Such fuels are also common in Europe^{157,158} and much of the world.


959 Fig. 17b encapsulates two alternative views of aerosol history. IPCC aerosol forcing slowly
 960 becomes important relative to GHG forcing. In our view, civilization always produced aerosols
 961 as well as GHGs. As sea level stabilized, organized societies and population grew as coastal
 962 biologic productivity increased¹⁵⁹ and agriculture developed. Wood was the main fuel. Aerosols
 963 travel great distances, as shown by Asian aerosols in North America.¹⁶⁰ Humans contributed to
 964 both rising GHG and aerosol climate forcings in the past 6,000 years. One result is that human-
 965 caused aerosol climate forcing is at least 0.5 W/m^2 more than usually assumed. Thus, the
 966 Faustian payment that will eventually come due is also larger, as discussed in Section 6.

967 5.3. Ambiguity in aerosol climate forcing

968 In this section we discuss uncertainty in the aerosol forcing. We discuss why global warming in
 969 the past century – often used to infer climate sensitivity – is ill-suited for that purpose.

970 Recent global warming does not yield a unique ECS because warming depends on three major
 971 unknowns with only two basic constraints. Unknowns are ECS, net climate forcing (aerosol
 972 forcing is unmeasured), and ocean mixing (many ocean models are too diffusive). Constraints
 973 are observed global temperature change and Earth’s energy imbalance (EEI).⁸⁸ Knutti¹⁶¹ and
 974 Hansen⁸⁰ suggest that many climate models compensate for excessive ocean mixing (which
 975 reduces surface warming) by using aerosol forcing less negative than the real world, thus
 976 achieving realistic surface warming. This issue is unresolved and complicated by the finding that
 977 cloud feedbacks can buffer ocean heat uptake (Section 3), affecting interpretation of EEI.


978 IPCC AR6 WG1 best estimate of aerosol forcing (Table AIII.3)¹³ is near maximum (negative)
 979 value by 1975, then nearly constant until rising in the 21st century to -1.09 W/m^2 in 2019 (Fig.
 980 18). We use this IPCC aerosol forcing in climate simulations here. We also use an alternative
 981 aerosol scenario¹⁶² that reaches -1.63 W/m^2 in 2010 relative to 1880 and -1.8 W/m^2 relative to
 982 1850 (Fig. 18) based on modeling of Koch¹⁶³ that included changing technology factors defined
 983 by Novakov.¹⁶⁴ This alternative scenario¹⁶⁵ is comparable to the forcing in some current aerosol




984
 985 Fig. 18. Aerosol forcing relative to 1850 from IPCC AR6, an alternative aerosol scenario¹⁶² and
 986 two aerosol model scenarios of Bauer et al. (2020).¹⁶⁶

987 models (Fig. 18). Human-made aerosol forcing relative to several millennia ago may be even
 988 more negative, by about -0.5 W/m^2 as discussed above, but the additional forcing was offset by
 989 increasing GHGs and thus those additional forcings are neglected, with climate assumed to be in
 990 approximate equilibrium in 1850.

991 Many combinations of climate sensitivity and aerosol forcing can fit observed global warming.
 992 The GISS (2014) model ($\text{ECS} = 2.6^\circ\text{C}$) with IPCC AR6 aerosol forcing can match observed
 993 warming (Fig. 19) in the last half century (when human-made climate forcing overwhelmed
 994 natural forcings, unforced climate variability, and flaws in observations). However, agreement
 995 also can be achieved by climate models with high ECS. The GISS (2020) model (with $\text{ECS} =$
 996 3.5°C) yields greater warming than observed if IPCC aerosol forcing is used, but less than
 997 observed for the alternative aerosol scenario (Fig. 19). This latter aerosol scenario achieves
 998 agreement with observed warming if $\text{ECS} \sim 4^\circ\text{C}$ (green curve in Fig. 19).¹⁶⁷ Agreement can be
 999 achieved with even higher ECS by use of a still more negative aerosol forcing.



1000
 1001 Fig. 19. Global temperature change T_G due to aerosols + GHGs calculated with Green's function
 1002 Eq (5) using GISS (2014) and GISS (2020) response functions (Fig. 4). Observed temperature is
 1003 the NASA GISS analysis.^{168,169} Base period: 1951-1980 for observations and model.




1004 Fig. 20. Total sulfate (parts per trillion by volume) and percentage of total sulfate provided by
 1005 shipping in simulations of Jin *et al.*¹⁷⁰ prior to IMO regulations on sulfur content of fuels.
 1006

1007 The issue we raise is the magnitude of the aerosol forcing, with implications for future warming
 1008 when particulate air pollution is likely to be reduced. We suggest that IPCC reports may have
 1009 gravitated toward climate sensitivity near 3°C for 2×CO₂ in part because of difficulty that
 1010 models have in realistically simulating amplifying cloud feedbacks and a climate model tendency
 1011 for excessive mixing of heat into the deep ocean. Our finding from paleoclimate analysis that
 1012 ECS is 1.2°C ± 0.3°C per W/m² (4.8°C ± 1.2°C for 2×CO₂) implies that the (unmeasured)
 1013 aerosol forcing must be more negative than IPCC’s best estimate. In turn – because aerosol-
 1014 cloud interactions are the main source of uncertainty in aerosol forcing – this finding emphasizes
 1015 the need to measure both global aerosol and cloud particle properties.

1016 The case for monitoring global aerosol climate forcing will grow as recognition of the need to
 1017 slow and reverse climate change emerges. Aerosol and cloud particle microphysics must be
 1018 measured with precision adequate to define the forcing.^{171,153} In the absence of such Keeling-like
 1019 global monitoring, progress can be made via more limited satellite measurements of aerosol and
 1020 cloud properties, field studies, and aerosol and cloud modeling. As described next, a great
 1021 opportunity to study aerosol and cloud physics is provided by a recent change in the IMO
 1022 (International Maritime Organization) regulations on ship emissions.

1023 5.4. The great inadvertent aerosol experiment

1024 Sulfate aerosols are cloud condensation nuclei (CCN), so sulfate emissions by ships result in a
 1025 larger number of smaller cloud particles, thus affecting cloud albedo and cloud lifetime.¹⁵⁵ Ships
 1026 provide a large percentage of sulfates in the North Pacific and North Atlantic regions (Fig. 20). It
 1027 has been suggested that cooling by these clouds is overestimated because of cloud liquid water
 1028 adjustments,¹⁷² but Manshausen *et al.*¹⁷³ present evidence that liquid water path (LWP) effects
 1029 are substantial even in regions without visible ship-tracks; they estimate a LWP forcing $-0.76 \pm$
 1030 0.27 W/m², in stark contrast with the IPCC estimate of $+0.2 \pm 0.2$ W/m². Wall *et al.*¹⁷⁴ use
 1031 satellite observations to quantify relationships between sulfates and low-level clouds; they
 1032 estimate a sulfate indirect aerosol forcing of -1.11 ± 0.43 W/m² over the global ocean. The
 1033 range of aerosol forcings used in CMIP6 and AR6 GCMs (small blue bar in Fig. 18) is not a
 1034 measure of aerosol forcing uncertainty. The larger bar, from Chapter 7¹⁷⁵ of AR6, has negative
 1035 forcing as great as -2 W/m², but even that does not measure the full uncertainty.




1036
 1037 Fig. 21. Global absorbed solar radiation (W/m^2) relative to mean of the first 120 months of
 1038 CERES data. CERES data are available at http://ceres.larc.nasa.gov/order_data.php

1039 Changes of IMO emission regulations provide a great opportunity for insight into aerosol climate
 1040 forcing. Sulfur content of fuels was limited to 1% in 2010 near the coasts of North America and
 1041 in the North Sea, Baltic Sea and English Channel, and further restricted there to 0.1% in 2015.¹⁷⁶
 1042 In 2020 a limit of 0.5% was imposed worldwide. The 1% limit did not have a noticeable effect
 1043 on ship-tracks, but a striking reduction of ship-tracks was found after the 2015 IMO regulations,
 1044 especially in the regions near land where emissions were specifically limited.¹⁷⁷ Following the
 1045 additional 2020 regulations,¹⁷⁸ global ship-tracks were reduced more than 50%.¹⁷⁹

1046 Earth's albedo (reflectivity) measured by CERES (Clouds and Earth's Radiant Energy System)
 1047 satellite-borne instruments⁸⁹ over the 22-years March 2000 to March 2022 reveal a decrease of
 1048 albedo and thus an increase of absorbed solar energy coinciding with the 2015 change of IMO
 1049 emission regulations. Global absorbed solar energy is $+1.05 \text{ W}/\text{m}^2$ in the period January 2015
 1050 through December 2022 relative to the mean for the first 10 years of data (Fig. 21). This increase
 1051 is 5 times greater than the standard deviation ($0.21 \text{ W}/\text{m}^2$) of annual absorbed solar energy in the
 1052 first 10 years of data and 4.5 times greater than the standard deviation ($0.23 \text{ W}/\text{m}^2$) of CERES
 1053 data through December 2014. The increase of absorbed solar energy is notably larger than
 1054 estimated potential CERES instrument drift, which is $<0.085 \text{ W}/\text{m}^2$ per decade.⁸⁹ Increased solar
 1055 energy absorption occurred despite 2015-2020 being the declining phase of the ~ 11 -year solar
 1056 irradiance cycle.¹⁸⁰ Nor can increased absorption be attributed to correlation of Earth's albedo
 1057 (and absorbed solar energy) with the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO): the PDO did shift to the
 1058 positive phase in 2014-2017, but it returned to the negative phase in 2017-2022.¹⁸¹

1059 Given the large increase of absorbed solar energy, cloud changes are likely the main cause.
 1060 Quantitative analysis¹⁸¹ of contributions to the 20-year trend of absorbed solar energy show that
 1061 clouds provide most of the change. Surface albedo decrease due to sea ice decline contributes to
 1062 the 20-year trend in the Northern Hemisphere, but that sea ice decline occurred especially in
 1063 2007, with minimum sea ice cover reached in 2012; over the past decade as global and
 1064 hemispheric albedos declined, sea ice had little trend.¹⁸² Potential causes of the cloud changes
 1065 include: 1) reduced aerosol forcing, 2) cloud feedbacks to global warming, 3) natural
 1066 variability.¹⁸³ Absorbed solar energy was $0.77 \text{ W}/\text{m}^2$ greater in Jan2015-Dec2022 than in the first
 1067 decade of CERES data at latitudes $20\text{-}60^\circ\text{S}$ (Fig. 22), a region of relatively little ship traffic. This
 1068 change is an order of magnitude larger than the estimate of potential detector degradation.⁸⁹



1069 Fig. 22. Absorbed solar radiation for indicated regions relative to first 120 months of CERES
 1070 data. Southern Hemisphere 20-60°S is 89% ocean. North Atlantic is (20-60°N, 0-60°W) and
 1071 North Pacific is (20-60°N, 120-220°W). Data source: http://ceres.larc.nasa.gov/order_data.php
 1072

1073 Climate models predict a reduction of cloud albedo in this region as a feedback effect driven by
 1074 global warming.¹⁸⁴ Continued monitoring of absorbed energy can confirm the reality of the
 1075 change, but without global monitoring of detailed physical properties of aerosols and clouds,¹⁵³ it
 1076 will be difficult to apportion observed change among candidate causes.

1077 North Pacific and North Atlantic regions of heavy ship traffic are ripe for detailed study of cloud
 1078 changes and their causes, although unforced cloud variability is large in such sub-global regions.
 1079 Both regions have increased absorption of solar radiation after 2015 (Fig. 22). The 2014-2017
 1080 maximum absorption in the North Pacific is likely enhanced by reduced cloud cover during the
 1081 positive PDO, but the more recent high absorption is during the negative PDO phase. In the
 1082 North Atlantic, persistence of increased absorption for several years exceeds prior variability, but
 1083 longer records plus aerosol and cloud microphysical data are needed for interpretation.

1084 6. SUMMARY

1085 Climate change is characterized by delayed response and amplifying feedbacks. Delayed
 1086 response makes human-made climate forcing a threat to today’s public and future generations
 1087 because of the practical difficulty of reversing the forcing once consequences become apparent.
 1088 Feedbacks determine climate sensitivity to any applied forcing. We find that Earth’s climate is
 1089 very sensitive – more sensitive than the best estimate of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
 1090 Change (IPCC) – which implies that there is a great amount of climate change “in the pipeline.”
 1091 Extraordinary actions are needed to reduce the net human-made climate forcing, as is required to
 1092 reduce global warming and avoid highly undesirable consequences for humanity and nature.

1093 6.1. Equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS)

1094 The 1979 Charney study⁴ considered an idealized climate sensitivity in which ice sheets and non-
 1095 CO₂ GHGs are fixed. The Charney group estimated that the equilibrium response to 2×CO₂, a
 1096 forcing of 4 W/m^2 , was 3°C, thus an ECS of 0.75°C per W/m^2 , with one standard deviation
 1097 uncertainty $\sigma = 0.375^\circ C$. Charney’s estimate stood as the canonical ECS for more than 40 years.
 1098 The current IPCC report¹³ concludes that 3°C for 2×CO₂ is their best estimate for ECS.

1099 We compare recent glacial and interglacial climates to infer ECS with a precision not possible
1100 with climate models alone. Uncertainty about Last Glacial Maximum (LGM) temperature has
1101 been resolved independently with consistent results by Tierney *et al.*⁵³ and Seltzer *et al.*⁵⁶ The
1102 Tierney approach, using a collection of geochemical temperature indicators in a global analysis
1103 constrained by climate change patterns defined by a global climate model, is used by Osman *et*
1104 *al.*⁵⁴ to find peak LGM cooling $7.0 \pm 1^\circ\text{C}$ (2σ , 95% confidence) at 21-18 kyBP. We show that,
1105 accounting for polar amplification, these analyses are consistent with the $5.8 \pm 0.6^\circ\text{C}$ LGM
1106 cooling of land areas between 45°S and 35°N found by Seltzer *et al.* using the temperature-
1107 dependent solubility of dissolved noble gases in ancient groundwater. The forcing that
1108 maintained the 7°C LGM cooling was the sum of $2.25 \pm 0.45 \text{ W/m}^2$ (2σ) from GHGs and $3.5 \pm$
1109 1.0 W/m^2 (2σ) from the LGM surface albedo, thus $5.75 \pm 1.1 \text{ W/m}^2$ (2σ). ECS implied by the
1110 LGM is thus $1.22 \pm 0.29^\circ\text{C}$ (2σ) per W/m^2 , which, at this final step, we round to $1.2 \pm 0.3^\circ\text{C}$ per
1111 W/m^2 . For transparency, we have combined uncertainties via simple RMS (root-mean-square).
1112 ECS as low as 3°C for $2\times\text{CO}_2$ is excluded at the 3σ level, i.e., with 99.7% confidence.

1113 More sophisticated mathematical analysis, which has merits but introduces opportunity for prior
1114 bias and obfuscation, is not essential; error assessment ultimately involves expert judgement.
1115 Instead, focus is needed on the largest source of error: LGM surface albedo change, which is
1116 uncertain because of the effect of cloud shielding on the efficacy of the forcing. As cloud
1117 modeling is advancing rapidly, this topic is ripe for collaboration of CMIP⁵⁸ (Coupled Model
1118 Intercomparison Project) with PMIP⁵⁹ (Paleoclimate Modelling Intercomparison Project).
1119 Simulations should include at the same time change of surface albedo and topography of ice
1120 sheets, vegetation change, and exposure of continental shelves due to lower sea level.

1121 Knowledge of climate sensitivity can be advanced further via analysis of the wide climate range
1122 in the Cenozoic era (Section 6.3). However, interpretation of data and models, and especially
1123 projections of climate change, depend on understanding of climate response time.

1124 **6.2. Climate response time**

1125 We expected climate response time – the time for climate to approach a new equilibrium after
1126 imposition of a forcing – to become faster as mixing of heat in ocean models improved.⁸⁰ That
1127 expectation was not met when we compared two generations of the GISS GCM (global climate
1128 model). The GISS (2020) GCM is improved^{34,35} in its ocean simulation over the GISS (2014)
1129 GCM as a result of higher vertical and horizontal resolution, more realistic parameterization of
1130 sub-grid scale motions, and correction of errors in the ocean computer program.³⁴ Yet the time
1131 for the model to achieve 63% of its equilibrium response remained about 100 years. There are
1132 two reasons for this: one that is obvious and one that is more interesting and informative.

1133 The surface in the newer model warms as fast as in the older model, but it must achieve greater
1134 warming to reach 63% of equilibrium because its ECS is higher, which is one reason that the
1135 response time remains long. The other reason is that Earth's energy imbalance (EEI) in the newer
1136 model decreases rapidly. EEI defines the rate that heat is pumped into the ocean, so a smaller
1137 EEI implies a longer time for the ocean to reach its new equilibrium temperature. Quick drop of
1138 EEI – in the first year after introduction of the forcing – implies existence of ultrafast feedback in
1139 the GISS (2020) model. For want of an alternative with such a large effect on Earth's energy

1140 budget, we infer a rapid cloud feedback and we suggest (Section 3.3) a set of brief GCM runs
1141 that define cloud changes and other diagnostic quantities to an arbitrary accuracy.

1142 The Charney report⁴ recognized that clouds were a main cause of a wide range in ECS estimates.
1143 Today, clouds still cast uncertainty on climate predictions. Several CMIP6³⁶ GCMs have ECS of
1144 $\sim 4\text{-}6^\circ\text{C}$ for $2\times\text{CO}_2$ ^{185,186} with the high sensitivity caused by cloud feedbacks.⁹² As cloud
1145 modeling progresses, it will aid understanding if climate models report their $2\times\text{CO}_2$ response
1146 functions for both temperature and EEI (Earth's energy imbalance).


1147 Fast EEI response – faster than global temperature response – has a practical effect: observed
1148 EEI understates the reduction of climate forcing required to stabilize climate. Although the
1149 magnitude of this effect is uncertain (see Supporting Material SM6), it makes the task of
1150 restoring a hospitable climate and saving coastal cities more challenging. On the other hand, long
1151 climate response time implies the potential for educated policies to affect the climate outcome
1152 before the most undesirable consequences occur.

1153 The time required for climate to reach a new equilibrium is relevant to policy (Section 7), but
1154 there is another response time of practical importance. With climate in a state of disequilibrium,
1155 how much time do we have before we pass the point of no return, the point where major climate
1156 impacts are locked in, beyond our ability to control? That's a complex matter; it requires
1157 understanding of “slow” feedbacks, especially ice sheets. It also depends on how far climate is
1158 out of equilibrium. Thus, we first consider the full Earth system sensitivity.

1159 **6.3. Earth system sensitivity (ESS)**

1160 The Cenozoic era – the past 66 million years – provides an opportunity to study Earth system
1161 sensitivity via a consistent analysis for climate ranging from hothouse conditions with Earth
1162 15°C warmer and sea level 60 m higher than preindustrial climate to glacial conditions with
1163 Earth 7°C cooler and sea level 120 m lower than preindustrial. Atmospheric CO_2 amount in the
1164 past 800,000 years (Fig. 2), confirms expectation that CO_2 is the main control knob⁹⁵ on global
1165 temperature. We can assume this control existed when CO_2 amount varied due to CO_2 emissions
1166 caused by plate tectonics (continental drift). The two-step⁹⁹ that the Indian plate executed as it
1167 moved through the Tethys (now Indian) ocean left a signature in atmospheric CO_2 and global
1168 temperature. CO_2 emissions from subduction of ocean crust were greatest when the Indian plate
1169 was moving fastest (inset, Fig. 6) and peaked at its hard collision with the Eurasian plate at 50
1170 MyBP. Diminishing metamorphic CO_2 emissions continue as the Indian plate is subducted
1171 beneath the Eurasian plate, pushing up the Himalayan Mountains, but carbon drawdown from
1172 weathering and burial of organic carbon exceed emissions. Motion of the Indian Plate thus
1173 dominates the broad sweep of Cenozoic CO_2 , but igneous provinces play a role. The North
1174 Atlantic Igneous Province (caused by a rift in the sea floor as Greenland pulled away from
1175 Europe) that triggered the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM) event about 56 MyBP
1176 and the Columbia River Flood Basalt about 15 MyBP (Fig. 6) are most notable.

1177 We infer the Cenozoic history of sea surface temperature (SST) at sites of deepwater formation
1178 from the oxygen isotope $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ in shells of deep-ocean-dwelling foraminifera preserved in ocean
1179 sediments.^{47,98} High latitude SST change – including a correction term as SST approaches the
1180 freezing point – provides an accurate estimate of global surface temperature change. This



1181 Fig. 23. Forcing required to yield Cenozoic temperature for today’s solar irradiance, compared
 1182 with human-made GHG forcing in 2022.
 1183


1184 Cenozoic temperature history and climate sensitivity inferred from the LGM cooling yield an
 1185 estimate of Cenozoic CO₂ history. We suggest that this whole-Cenozoic approach may define the
 1186 CO₂ history (Fig. 9a) more accurately than CO₂ proxy measurements. We find CO₂ about 325
 1187 ppm in the early Pliocene and 450 ppm at transition to glaciated Antarctica. Global climate
 1188 models (GCMs) that isolate on the Pliocene tend to use CO₂ levels of order 400 ppm in attempts
 1189 to match actual Pliocene warmth and ice sheet models use CO₂ of order 700 ppm or greater to
 1190 achieve ice sheet disintegration on Antarctica, which suggests that the models are not
 1191 realistically capturing amplifying feedback processes (see Section 4.3).

1192 The Cenozoic provides a perspective on present greenhouse gas (GHG) levels. The dashed line
 1193 in Fig. 23 is the “we are here” level of GHG climate forcing. Today’s GHG forcing of 4.6 W/m²
 1194 is relative to mid-Holocene CO₂ of 260 ppm; we present evidence in Section 4.3 that 260 ppm is
 1195 the natural Holocene CO₂ level. Human-caused GHG forcing today is already above the level
 1196 needed to deglaciate Antarctica, if such forcing is left in place long enough. We do not predict
 1197 full deglaciation of Antarctica on a time scale people care about – rather we draw attention to
 1198 how far today’s climate is out of equilibrium with today’s GHG level. This is one measure of
 1199 how strongly humanity is pushing the climate system. Stabilizing climate requires removing the
 1200 disequilibrium by reducing human-made climate forcing. A danger is that it will become difficult
 1201 or implausible to prevent large sea level rise, if deglaciation is allowed to get well underway.

1202 GHGs are not the only large human-made climate forcing. Understanding of ongoing climate
 1203 change requires that we also include the effect of aerosols (fine airborne particles).

1204 6.4. Aerosols

1205 Aerosol climate forcing is larger than the IPCC AR6 estimate and has likely been significant for
 1206 millennia. We know of no other persuasive explanation for absence of global warming in the last
 1207 half of the Holocene (Fig. 14) as GHG forcing increased 0.5 W/m² (Fig. 15). Climate models
 1208 without a growing negative aerosol forcing yield notable warming in that period,¹⁸⁷ a warming
 1209 that, in fact, did not occur. Negative aerosol forcing, increasing as civilization developed and
 1210 population grew, is expected. As humans burned fuels at a growing rate – wood and other
 1211 biomass for millennia and fossil fuels in the industrial era – aerosols as well as GHGs were an



1212
 1213 Fig. 24. Global temperature relative to 1880-1920. Edges of the predicted post-2010 accelerated
 1214 warming rate (see text) are 0.36 and 0.27°C per decade.


1215 abundant, growing, biproduct. The aerosol source from wood-burning has continued in modern
 1216 times.¹⁸⁸ GHGs are long-lived and accumulate, so their forcing dominates eventually, unless
 1217 aerosol emissions grow higher and higher – the Faustian bargain.¹⁰⁶

1218 Multiple lines of evidence show that aerosol forcing peaked early this century.¹⁸⁹ Emissions from
 1219 the largest sources, China and India, were increasing in 2000, but by 2010 when the first limits
 1220 on ship emissions were imposed, China’s emissions were declining. We estimate peak (negative)
 1221 aerosol forcing as at least 1.5-2 W/m², with turning point at 2010, consistent with Fig. 3 of Bauer
 1222 et al.¹⁹⁰ GHG plus aerosol forcing grew +0.3 W/m² per decade (GHGs: +0.45, aerosols: – 0.15)
 1223 during 1970-2010, which produced warming of 0.18°C per decade. With current policies, we
 1224 expect climate forcing for a few decades post-2010 to increase 0.5-0.6 W/m² per decade and
 1225 produce global warming of at least +0.27°C per decade. In that case, global warming will reach
 1226 1.5°C in the 2020s and 2°C before 2050 (Fig. 24). Such acceleration is dangerous in a climate
 1227 system that is already far out of equilibrium and dominated by multiple amplifying feedbacks.

1228 The sharp change of ship emissions in 2020 (Section 5.4) provides an indirect measure of aerosol
 1229 effects. Diamond¹⁹¹ finds a cloud brightness decrease of order 1 W/m² in a shipping corridor. We
 1230 find a larger effect, increased absorption by at least 2 W/m² in regions of heavy ship traffic in the
 1231 North Atlantic and North Pacific (Fig. 22), but a longer record is needed to define significance.
 1232 However, the single best sentinel for global climate change is Earth’s energy imbalance.

1233 6.5. Earth’s energy imbalance

1234 Earth’s energy imbalance (EEI) is the net gain (or loss) of energy by the planet, the difference
 1235 between absorbed solar energy and emitted thermal (heat) radiation. As long as EEI is positive,
 1236 Earth will continue to get hotter. EEI is hard to measure, a small difference between two large
 1237 quantities (Earth absorbs and emits about 240 W/m² averaged over the entire planetary surface),
 1238 but change of EEI can be well-measured from space.⁸⁹ Absolute calibration is from the change of
 1239 heat in the heat reservoirs, mainly the global ocean, over a period of at least a decade, as needed



1240 Fig. 25. 12-month running-mean of Earth’s energy imbalance from CERES satellite data⁸⁹
 1241 normalized to 0.71 W/m² mean for July 2005 – June 2015 (blue bar) from in situ data.⁸⁸
 1242


1243 to reduce error due to the finite number of places that the ocean is sampled.⁸⁸ EEI varies year-to-
 1244 year (Fig. 25), largely because global cloud amount varies with weather and ocean dynamics, but
 1245 averaged over several years EEI helps inform us about what is needed to stabilize climate.

1246 The data indicate that EEI has doubled since the first decade of this century (Fig. 25). This
 1247 increase is one basis for our prediction of post-2010 acceleration of the global warming rate. The
 1248 EEI increase may be partly due to restrictions on maritime aerosol precursor emissions imposed
 1249 in 2015 and 2020 (Section 5.4), but the growth rate of GHG climate forcing also increased in
 1250 2015 and since has remained at the higher level (Section 6.6).

1251 Reduction of climate forcing needed to reduce EEI to zero is greater than EEI because of
 1252 ultrafast cloud feedback (Section 3.3), but the magnitude of this effect is uncertain (SM6). Cloud
 1253 feedbacks are only beginning to be simulated well, but climate sensitivity near 1.2°C per W/m²
 1254 implies that the net cloud feedback is large and deserves greater attention. Precise monitoring of
 1255 EEI is essential as a sentinel for future climate change and to assess efforts to stabilize climate
 1256 and avoid undesirable consequences. Global satellite monitoring of geographical and temporal
 1257 changes of EEI and ocean in situ monitoring (especially in polar regions of rapid change) are
 1258 both needed for the sake of understanding ongoing climate change.

1259 **6.6. Global warming in the pipeline and committed warming**

1260 Global warming “in the pipeline” is the equilibrium warming for today’s climate forcing, i.e., it
 1261 is the warming required to restore Earth’s energy balance if atmospheric composition is fixed at
 1262 today’s conditions. Equilibrium warming is a benchmark that can be evaluated from atmospheric
 1263 composition and paleoclimate data, with little involvement of climate models. It is the standard
 1264 benchmark used in definition of the Charney ECS (equilibrium climate sensitivity excluding
 1265 slow feedbacks)⁴ and ESS (Earth system sensitivity, which includes slow feedbacks such as ice
 1266 sheet size).⁷⁶ GHG climate forcing now is 4.6 W/m² relative to the mid-Holocene (7kyBP) or 4.1
 1267 W/m² relative to 1750. There is little merit in debating whether GHG forcing is 4.6 or 4.1 W/m²
 1268 because it is still increasing 0.5 W/m² per decade (Sec. 7). ECS response to 4.6 W/m² forcing for
 1269 climate sensitivity 1.2°C per W/m² is 5.5°C. The eventual Earth system response (ESS) to
 1270 sustained 4.6 W/m² forcing is about 10°C (Sec. 6.3), because that forcing is large enough to
 1271 deglaciade Antarctica (Fig. 23). Net human-made forcing today is probably near 3 W/m² due to




1272
1273 Fig. 26. Fossil fuel emissions divided into portions appearing in the annual increase of airborne
1274 CO₂ and the remainder, which is taken up by the ocean and land (1 ppm CO₂ ~ 2.12 GtC).

1275 negative aerosol forcing. Even 3 W/m² may be sufficient to largely deglaciate Antarctica, if the
1276 forcing is left in place permanently (Fig. 23).

1277 “Committed warming” is less precisely defined; even in the current IPCC report¹³ (p. 2222) it
1278 has multiple definitions. One concept is the warming that occurs if human-made GHG emissions
1279 cease today, but that definition is ill-posed as well as unrealistic. Do aerosol emissions also
1280 cease? That would cause a sudden leap in Earth’s energy imbalance, a “termination shock,” as
1281 the cooling effect of human-made aerosols disappears. A more useful definition is the warming
1282 that will occur with plausibly rapid phasedown of GHG emissions, including comparison with
1283 ongoing reality. However, the required “integrated assessment models,” while useful, are
1284 complex and contain questionable assumptions that can mislead policy (see Sec. 7).

1285 Nature’s capacity for restoration provides hope that future warming can be limited, if humanity
1286 moves promptly toward sustainable energy and climate policies. Earth’s ability to remove
1287 human-made CO₂ emissions from the atmosphere is revealed by Fig. 26. Fossil fuel emissions
1288 now total more than 10 GtC/year, which is almost 5 ppm of CO₂, yet CO₂ in the air is only
1289 increasing 2.5 ppm/year. The other half is being taken up by the ocean, solid land, and biosphere.
1290 Indeed, Earth is taking up even more because deforestation, fires, and poor agricultural and
1291 forestry practices are additional human-made CO₂ sources. If human emissions ceased,
1292 atmospheric CO₂ would initially decline a few ppm per year, but uptake would soon slow – it
1293 would take millennia for CO₂ to reach preindustrial levels.¹⁴² This underscores the urgency to
1294 reduce emissions rapidly. Balanced against that imperative is the fact that fossil fuels have raised
1295 living standards in most of the world and still provide 80 percent of the world’s energy. As the
1296 reality of climate change emerges, the delayed response of climate assures that the world has
1297 already set sail onto even more turbulent climate seas. Scientists must do their best to help the
1298 public understand policy options that may preserve and restore a propitious climate for future
1299 generations.



1300
1301

Fig. 27. Global energy consumption and CO₂ emissions (Hefner et al.¹⁹² and BP¹⁹³).


1302 **7. Perspective on policy implications**

1303 This section is the first author’s perspective based on more than 20 years of experience on policy
 1304 issues that began with a paper¹⁹⁴ and two workshops¹⁹⁵ that he organized at the East-West Center
 1305 in Hawaii, followed by meetings and workshops with utility experts and trips to more than a
 1306 dozen nations for discussions with government officials, energy experts, and environmentalists.
 1307 The aim was to find a realistic scenario with a bright energy and climate future, with emphasis
 1308 on cooperation between the West and nations with emerging or underdeveloped economies.

1309 **7.1 Energy, CO₂ and the climate threat**

1310 The world’s energy and climate path has good reason: fossil fuels powered the industrial
 1311 revolution and raised living standards. Fossil fuels still provide most of the world’s energy (Fig.
 1312 27a) and produce most CO₂ emissions (Fig. 27b). Much of the world is still in early or middle
 1313 stages of economic development. Energy is needed and fossil fuels are a convenient, affordable
 1314 source of energy. One gallon (3.8 liters) of gasoline (petrol) provides the work equivalent of
 1315 more than 400 hours labor by a healthy adult. These benefits are the basic reason for continued
 1316 high emissions. The Covid pandemic dented emissions in 2020, but 2022 global emissions were
 1317 a record high level. Fossil fuel emissions from mature economies are beginning to fall due to
 1318 increasing energy efficiency, introduction of carbon-free energies, and export of manufacturing
 1319 from mature economies to emerging economies. However, at least so far, those reductions have
 1320 been more than offset by increasing emissions in developing nations (Fig. 28).

1321 The potential for rising CO₂ to be a serious threat to humanity was the reason for the 1979
 1322 Charney report, which confirmed that climate was likely sensitive to expected CO₂ levels in the
 1323 21st century. In the 1980s it emerged that high climate sensitivity implied a long delay between
 1324 changing atmospheric composition and the full climate response. Ice core data revealed the
 1325 importance of amplifying climate feedbacks. A climate characterized by delayed response and
 1326 amplifying feedbacks is especially dangerous because the public and policymakers are unlikely
 1327 to make fundamental changes in world energy systems until they see visible evidence of the
 1328 threat. Thus, it is incumbent on scientists to make this situation clear to the public as soon as
 1329 possible. That task is complicated by the phenomenon of scientific reticence.



1330 Fig. 28. Fossil fuel CO₂ emissions from mature and emerging economies. China is counted as an
 1331 emerging economy. Data sources as in Fig. 27.
 1332

1333 **7.2 Scientific reticence**

1334 Bernard Barber decried the absence of attention to scientific reticence, a tendency of scientists to
 1335 resist scientific discovery or new ideas.¹⁵⁰ Richard Feynman needled fellow physicists about
 1336 their reticence to challenge authority,¹⁹⁶ specifically to correct the electron charge that Millikan
 1337 derived in his famous oil drop experiment. Later researchers moved Millikan’s result bit by bit –
 1338 experimental uncertainties allow judgment – reaching an accurate result only after years. Their
 1339 reticence embarrassed the physics community, but caused no harm to society. A factor that may
 1340 contribute to reticence among climate scientists is “delay discounting:” preference for immediate
 1341 over delayed rewards.¹⁹⁷ The penalty for “crying wolf” is immediate, while the danger of being
 1342 blamed for “fiddling while Rome was burning” is distant. One of us has noted¹⁹⁸ that larding of
 1343 papers and proposals with caveats and uncertainties increases chances of obtaining research
 1344 support. “Gradualism” that results from reticence is comfortable and well-suited for maintaining
 1345 long-term support. Gradualism is apparent in IPCC’s history in evaluating climate sensitivity as
 1346 summarized in our present paper. Barber identifies professional specialization – which causes
 1347 “outsiders” to be ignored by “insiders” – as one cause of reticence; specialization is relevant to
 1348 ocean and ice sheet dynamics, matters upon which the future of young people hangs.


1349 Discussion¹⁹⁹ with field glaciologists²⁰⁰ 20 years ago revealed frustration with IPCC’s ice sheet
 1350 assessment. One glaciologist said – about a photo²⁰¹ of a moulin (a vertical shaft that carries
 1351 meltwater to the base of the Greenland ice sheet) – “the whole ice sheet is going down that
 1352 damned hole!” Concern was based on observed ice sheet changes and paleoclimate evidence of
 1353 sea level rise by several meters in a century, implying that ice sheet collapse is an exponential
 1354 process. Thus, as an alternative to ice sheet models, we carried out a study described in *Ice*
 1355 *Melt*.¹⁴ In a GCM simulation, we added a growing freshwater flux to the ocean surface mixed
 1356 layer around Greenland and Antarctica, with the flux in the early 21st century based on estimates
 1357 from *in situ* glaciological studies²⁰² and satellite data on sea level trends near Antarctica.²⁰³
 1358 Doubling times of 10 and 20 years were used for the growth of freshwater flux. One merit of our
 1359 GCM was reduced, more realistic, small-scale ocean mixing, with a result that Antarctic Bottom
 1360 Water formed close to the Antarctic coast,¹⁴ as in the real world. Growth of meltwater and GHG
 1361 emissions led to shutdown of the North Atlantic and Southern Ocean overturning circulations,

1362 amplified warming at the foot of the ice shelves that buttress the ice sheets, and other feedbacks
1363 consistent with “nonlinearly growing sea level rise, reaching several meters in 50-150 years.”¹⁴
1364 Shutdown of ocean overturning circulation occurs this century, as early as midcentury. The 50-
1365 150-year time scale for multimeter sea level rise is consistent with the 10-20-year range for ice
1366 melt doubling time. Real-world ice melt will not follow a smooth curve, but its growth rate is
1367 likely to accelerate in coming years due to increasing heat flux into the ocean (Fig. 25).

1368 We submitted *Ice Melt* to a journal that makes reviews [publicly available](#).²⁰⁴ One reviewer, an
1369 IPCC lead author, seemed intent on blocking publication, while the other reviewer described the
1370 paper as a “masterwork of scholarly synthesis, modeling virtuosity, and insight, with profound
1371 implications.” Thus, the editor obtained additional reviewers, who recommended publication.
1372 Promptly, an indictment was published²⁰⁵ of our conclusion that continued high GHG emissions
1373 would cause shutdown of the AMOC (Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation) this century.
1374 The 15 authors, representing leading GCM groups, used 21 climate projections from eight
1375 “...state-of-the-science, IPCC class...” GCMs to conclude that “...the probability of an AMOC
1376 collapse is negligible. This is contrary to a recent modeling study [*Hansen et al., 2016*] that used
1377 a much larger, and in our assessment unrealistic, Northern Hemisphere freshwater forcing...
1378 According to our probabilistic assessment, the likelihood of an AMOC collapse remains very
1379 small (<1% probability) if global warming is below ~5K...”.²⁰⁵ They treated the ensemble of
1380 their model results as if it were the probability distribution for the real world.

1381 In contrast, we used paleoclimate evidence, global modeling, and ongoing climate observations.
1382 Paleoclimate data²⁰⁶ showed that AMOC shutdown is not unusual and occurred in the Eemian
1383 (when global temperature was similar to today), and also that sea level in the Eemian rose a few
1384 meters within a century²⁰⁷ with the likely source being collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet.
1385 Although we would not assert that our model corrected all excessive ocean mixing, the higher
1386 vertical resolution and improved mixing increased the sensitivity to freshwater flux, as
1387 confirmed in later tests.²⁰⁸ Modern observations showed and continue to add evidence that the
1388 overturning Southern Ocean^{209,210} and North Atlantic²¹¹ are already slowing. Growth of
1389 meltwater injection onto the Southern²¹² and North Atlantic Oceans²¹³ is consistent with a
1390 doubling time of 10-20 years. High climate sensitivity inferred in our present paper also implies
1391 there will be a greater increase of precipitation on polar oceans than that in most climate models.


1392 The indictment of *Ice Melt* by Bakker *et al.*²⁰⁵ was accepted by the research community. Papers
1393 on the same topics ignored our paper or referred to it parenthetically with a note that we used
1394 unrealistic melt rates, even though these were based on observations. *Ice Melt* was blackballed in
1395 IPCC’s AR6 report, which is a form of censorship.¹⁵ Science usually acknowledges alternative
1396 views and grants ultimate authority to nature. In the opinion of our first author, IPCC does not
1397 want its authority challenged and is comfortable with gradualism. Caution has merits, but the
1398 delayed response and amplifying feedbacks of climate make excessive reticence a danger. Our
1399 present paper – via revelation that the equilibrium response to current atmospheric composition
1400 is a nearly ice-free Antarctica – amplifies concern about locking in nonlinearly growing sea level
1401 rise. Also, our conclusion that CO₂ was about 450 ppm at Antarctic glaciation disparages ice
1402 sheet models. Portions of the ice sheets may be recalcitrant to rapid change, but enough ice is in
1403 contact with the ocean to provide of the order of 25 m (80 feet) of sea level rise. Thus, if we
1404 allow a few meters of sea level rise, we may lock in much larger sea level rise.




1405
 1406 Fig. 29. Fossil fuel CO₂ emissions by nation or region as a fraction of global emissions. Data
 1407 sources as in Fig. 27.

1408 **7.3 Climate change responsibilities**

1409 The industrial revolution began in the U.K., which was the largest source of fossil fuel emissions
 1410 in the 19th century (Fig. 29a), but development soon moved to Germany, the rest of Europe, and
 1411 the U.S. Nearly half of global emissions were from the U.S. in the early 20th century, and the
 1412 U.S. is presently the largest source of cumulative emissions (Fig. 29b) that drive climate
 1413 change.^{214,215} Mature economies, mainly in the West, are responsible for most cumulative
 1414 emissions, especially on a per capita basis (Fig. 30). Growth of emissions is now occurring in
 1415 emerging economies (Figs. 28 and 29a). China’s cumulative emissions will eventually pass those
 1416 of the U.S. in the absence of a successful effort to replace coal with carbon-free energy.



1417
 1418 Fig. 30. Cumulative per capita national fossil fuel emissions.²¹⁶




1419
 1420 Fig. 31. Annual growth of climate forcing by GHGs⁴¹ including part of O₃ forcing not included
 1421 in CH₄ forcing (Supp. Material). MPTG and OTG are Montreal Protocol and Other Trace Gases.

1422 **7.4 Greenhouse gas emissions situation**

1423 The United Nations uses a target for maximum global warming to cajole progress in limiting
 1424 climate change. The 2015 Paris Agreement²¹⁷ aimed to hold “the increase in the global average
 1425 temperature to well below 2°C above the pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to limit the
 1426 temperature increase to 1.5°C above the pre-industrial levels.” The IPCC AR5 report added a
 1427 climate forcing scenario, RCP2.6, with a rapid decrease of GHG climate forcings, as needed to
 1428 prevent global warming from exceeding 2°C. Since then, a gap between that scenario and reality
 1429 opened and is growing (Fig. 31). The 0.03 W/m² gap in 2022 could be closed by extracting CO₂
 1430 from the air. However, required negative emissions (CO₂ extracted from the air and stored
 1431 permanently) must be larger than the desired atmospheric CO₂ reduction by a factor of about
 1432 1.7.⁶⁸ Thus, the required CO₂ extraction is 2.1 ppm, which is 7.6 GtC. Based on a pilot direct-air
 1433 carbon capture plant, Keith²¹⁸ estimates an extraction cost of \$450-920 per tC, as clarified
 1434 elsewhere.²¹⁹ Keith’s cost range yields an extraction cost of \$3.4-7.0 trillion. That covers excess
 1435 emissions in 2022 only; it is an annual cost. Given the difficulty the UN faced in raising \$0.1
 1436 trillion for climate purposes and the growing emissions gap (Fig. 31), this example shows the
 1437 need to reduce emissions as rapidly as practical and shows that carbon capture cannot be viewed
 1438 as the solution, although it may play a role in a portfolio of policies, if its cost is driven down.

1439 IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), the scientific body advising the world on
 1440 climate, has not bluntly informed the world that the present “wishful thinking” policy approach
 1441 will be disastrous. The “tragedy of the commons”²²⁰ is that, as long as fossil fuel pollution can be
 1442 dumped in the air free of charge, agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol²²¹ and Paris Agreement
 1443 have little effect on global emissions. Political leaders profess ambitions for dubious net-zero
 1444 emissions while fossil fuel extraction expands. IPCC scenarios that phase down human-made
 1445 climate change amount to “a miracle will occur.” The IPCC scenario that moves rapidly to
 1446 negative global emissions (RCP2.6) has vast biomass-burning powerplants that capture and
 1447 sequester CO₂, a nature-ravaging, food-security-threatening,²²² proposition without scientific and
 1448 engineering credibility and without a realistic chance of being deployed at scale and on time to
 1449 address the climate threat.



1450 Fig. 32. Carbon intensity (carbon emissions per unit energy use) of several nations and the world.
 1451 Mtoe = megatons of oil equivalent. Data sources as in Fig. 27.
 1452

1453 **7.5 Climate and energy policy**

1454 Climate science reveals the threat of being too late. “Being too late” refers not only to warning of
 1455 the climate threat, but also to technical advice on policy implications. Are we scientists not
 1456 complicit if we allow reticence and comfort to obfuscate our description of the climate situation?
 1457 Does our training, years of graduate study and decades of experience, not make us well-equipped
 1458 to advise the public on the climate situation and its policy implications? As professionals with
 1459 deep understanding of planetary change and as guardians of young people and their future, do we
 1460 not have an obligation, analogous to the code of ethics of medical professionals, to render to the
 1461 public our full and unencumbered diagnosis? That is our objective.

1462 The basis for the following opinions of the first author, to the extent not covered in this paper,
 1463 will be described in a book in preparation.² We are in the early phase of a climate emergency.
 1464 The present huge planetary energy imbalance assures that climate will become less tolerable to
 1465 humanity, with greater climate extremes, before it is feasible to reverse the trend. Reversing the
 1466 trend is essential – we must cool the planet – for the sake of preserving shorelines and saving the
 1467 world’s coastal cities. Cooling will also address other major problems caused by global warming.
 1468 We should aim to return to a climate like that in which civilization developed, in which the
 1469 nature that we know and love thrived. As far as is known, it is still feasible to do that without
 1470 passing through irreversible disasters such as many-meter sea level rise.

1471 Abundant, affordable, carbon-free energy is essential to achieve a world with propitious climate,
 1472 while recognizing the rights and aspirations of all people. The staggering magnitude of the task is
 1473 implied by global and national carbon intensities: carbon emissions per unit energy use (Fig. 32).
 1474 Global carbon intensity must decline to near zero over the next several decades. This chart – not
 1475 vaporous promises of net zero future carbon emissions inserted in integrated assessment models
 1476 – should guide realistic assessment of progress toward clean energy. Policy must include
 1477 apolitical targeting of support for development of low-cost carbon-free energy. All nations would
 1478 do well to study strategic decisions of Sweden, which led past decarbonization efforts (Fig. 32)
 1479 and is likely to lead in the quest for zero or negative carbon intensity that will be needed to
 1480 achieve a bright future for today’s young people and future generations.

1481 Given the global situation that we have allowed to develop, three actions are now essential.

1482 First, underlying economic incentives must be installed globally to promote clean energy and
1483 discourage CO₂ emissions. Thus, a rising price on GHG emissions is needed, enforced by border
1484 duties on products from nations without a carbon fee. Public buy-in and maximum efficacy
1485 require the funds to be distributed to the public, which will also address wealth disparity.
1486 Economists in the U.S. support carbon fee-and-dividend;²²³ college and high school students join
1487 in advocacy.²²⁴ A rising carbon price creates a level playing field for energy efficiency,
1488 renewable energy, nuclear power, and innovations; it would spur the thousands of “miracles”
1489 needed for energy transition. However, instead, fossil fuels and renewable energy are now
1490 subsidized. Thus, nuclear energy has been disadvantaged and excluded as a “clean development
1491 mechanism” under the Kyoto Protocol, based on myths about nuclear energy unsupported by
1492 scientific fact.²²⁵ A rising carbon price is crucial for decarbonization, but not enough. Long-term
1493 planning is needed. Sweden provides an example: 50 years ago, its government decided to
1494 replace fossil fuel power stations with nuclear energy, which led to its extraordinary and rapid
1495 decarbonization (Fig. 32).

1496 Second, global cooperation is needed. De facto cooperation between the West and China drove
1497 down the price of renewable energy. Without greater cooperation, developing nations will be the
1498 main source of future GHG emissions (Fig. 28). Carbon-free, dispatchable electricity is a crucial
1499 need. Nations with emerging economies are eager to have modern nuclear power because of its
1500 small environmental footprint. China-U.S. cooperation to develop low-cost nuclear power was
1501 proposed, but stymied by U.S. prohibition of technology transfer.²²⁶ Competition is normal, but it
1502 can be managed if there is a will, reaping benefits of cooperation over confrontation.²²⁷ Of late,
1503 priority has been given instead to economic and military hegemony, despite recognition of the
1504 climate threat, and without consultation with young people or seeming consideration of their
1505 aspirations. Scientists can support an ecumenical perspective of our shared future by expanding
1506 international cooperation. Awareness of the gathering climate storm will grow this decade, so we
1507 must increase scientific understanding worldwide as needed for climate restoration.

1508 Third, we must take action to reduce and reverse Earth’s energy imbalance. Highest priority is to
1509 phase down emissions, but it is no longer feasible to rapidly restore energy balance via only
1510 GHG emission reductions. Additional action is almost surely needed to prevent grievous
1511 escalation of climate impacts including lock-in of sea level rise that could destroy coastal cities
1512 world-wide. At least several years will be needed to define and gain acceptance of an approach
1513 for climate restoration. This effort should not deter action on mitigation of emissions; on the
1514 contrary, the concept of human intervention in climate is distasteful to many people, so support
1515 for GHG emission reductions will likely increase. Temporary solar radiation management (SRM)
1516 will probably be needed, e.g., via purposeful injection of atmospheric aerosols. Risks of such
1517 intervention must be defined, as well as risks of no intervention; thus, the U.S. National
1518 Academy of Sciences recommends research on SRM.²²⁸ The Mt. Pinatubo eruption of 1991 is a
1519 natural experiment^{229,230} with a forcing that reached³² -3 W/m^2 . Pinatubo deserves a coordinated
1520 study with current models. The most innocuous aerosols may be fine salty droplets extracted
1521 from the ocean and sprayed into the air by autonomous sailboats.²³¹ This approach has been
1522 discussed for potential use on a global scale,²³² but it needs research into potential unintended
1523 effects.²³³ This decade may be our last chance to develop the knowledge, technical capability,
1524 and political will for actions needed to save global coastal regions from long-term inundation.


1525 **7.6 Politics and climate change**

1526 Actions needed to drive carbon intensity to zero – most important a rising carbon fee – are
1527 feasible, but not happening. The first author gained perspective on the reasons why during trips
1528 to Washington, DC, and to other nations at the invitation of governments, environmentalists, and,
1529 in one case, oil executives in London. Politicians from right (conservative) and left (progressive)
1530 parties are affected by fossil fuel interests. The right denies that fossil fuels cause climate change
1531 or says that the effect is exaggerated. The left takes up the climate cause but proposes actions
1532 with only modest effect, such as cap-and-trade with offsets, including giveaways to the fossil
1533 fuel industry. The left also points to work of Amory Lovins as showing that energy efficiency
1534 plus renewables (mainly wind and solar energy) are sufficient to phase out fossil fuels. Lovins
1535 says that nuclear power is not needed. It is no wonder that the President of Shell Oil would write
1536 a foreword with praise for Lovins' book, *Reinventing Fire*,²³⁴ and that the oil executives in
1537 London did not see Lovins' work as a threat to their business.

1538 Opportunities for progress often occur in conjunction with crises. Today, the world faces a crisis
1539 – political polarization, especially in the United States – that threatens effective governance. Yet
1540 the crisis offers an opportunity for young people to help shape the future of the nation and the
1541 planet. Ideals professed by the United States at the end of World War II were consummated in
1542 formation of the United Nations, the World Bank, the Marshall Plan, and the Universal
1543 Declaration of Human Rights. Progress toward equal rights continued, albeit slowly. The
1544 “American dream” of economic opportunity was real, as most people willing to work hard could
1545 afford college. Immigration policy welcomed the brightest; NASA in the 1960s invited scientists
1546 from European countries, Japan, China, India, Canada, and those wanting to stay found
1547 immigration to be straightforward. But the power of special interests in Washington grew,
1548 government became insular and inefficient, and Congress refused to police itself. Their first
1549 priority became reelection and maintenance of elite status, supported by special interests.
1550 Thousands of pages of giveaways to special interests lard every funding bill, including the
1551 climate bill titled “Inflation Reduction Act” – Orwellian double-speak – as the funding is
1552 borrowed from young people via deficit spending. The public is fed up with the Washington
1553 swamp but hamstrung by rigid two-party elections focused on a polarized cultural war.

1554 A political party that takes no money from special interests is essential to address political
1555 polarization, which is necessary if the West is to be capable of helping preserve the planet and a
1556 bright future for coming generations. Young people showed their ability to drive an election –
1557 via their support of Barack Obama in 2008 and Bernie Sanders in 2016 – without any funding
1558 from special interests. Groundwork is being laid to allow third party candidates in 2026 and 2028
1559 elections in the U.S. Ranked voting is being advocated in every state to avoid the “spoiler” effect
1560 of a third party. It is asking a lot to expect young people to grasp the situation that they have
1561 been handed – but a lot is at stake. As they realize that they are being handed a planet in decline,
1562 the first reaction may be to stamp their feet and demand that governments do better, but that has
1563 little effect. Nor is it sufficient to parrot big environmental organizations, which are now part of
1564 the problem, as they are partly supported by the fossil fuel industry and wealthy donors who are
1565 comfortable with the status quo. Instead, young people have the opportunity to provide the drive
1566 for a revolutionary third party that restores democratic ideals while developing the technical
1567 knowledge that is needed to navigate the stormy sea that their world is setting out upon.

1568 **SUPPORTING MATERIAL**



1569
 1570 Fig. S1. Greenhouse gas (GHG) climate forcings for the five terms in Equation (4). The forcings
 1571 incorporate efficacies, including effects of a 3-dimensional atmosphere and seasonal change,
 1572 which alter the adjusted forcings calculated with a 1-dimensional radiative-convective model.

1573 **SM1. GHG forcing formulae and comparison with IPCC forcings**


1574 Formulae¹⁹⁴ (Table 1) for adjusted forcing, F_a , were numerical fits to 1-D calculations with the
 1575 GISS GCM radiation code using the correlated k-distribution method.³⁸ Gas absorption data
 1576 were from high spectral resolution laboratory data.³⁹ These F_a were converted to F_e via GCM
 1577 calculations that include 3-D effects, as summarized in Eq. (4), where the coefficients are from
 1578 Table 1 of *Efficacy*.³² The factor 1.45 for CH_4 includes the effect of CH_4 change on stratospheric
 1579 H_2O and tropospheric O_3 . We assume that CH_4 is responsible for 45% of the O_3 change.⁴⁰ The
 1580 remaining 55% of the O_3 forcing is obtained by multiplying the IPCC AR6 O_3 forcing (0.47
 1581 W/m^2 in 2019) by 0.55 and by 0.82, where the latter factor is the efficacy that converts F_a to F_e .
 1582 The non- CH_4 portion of the O_3 forcing is thus 0.21 W/m^2 in 2019. The time-dependence of this
 1583 portion of the O_3 forcing is from Table AIII.3 in IPCC AR6. MPTGs and OTGs are Montreal
 1584 Protocol Trace Gases and Other Trace Gases.⁴¹ An updated list of these gases and a table of
 1585 their annual forcings since 1992 are [available](#) as are [earlier data](#).⁴²

Table 1. Greenhouse gas radiative forcings

Gas	Radiative forcing
CO_2	$F = f(c) - f(c_o)$, where $f(c) = 4.996 \ln(c + 0.0005c^2)$
CH_4	$F = 0.0406(\sqrt{m} - \sqrt{m_o}) - [g(m, n_o) - g(m_o, n_o)]$
N_2O	$F = 0.136(\sqrt{n} - \sqrt{n_o}) - [g(m_o, n) - g(m_o, n_o)]$, where $g(m, n) = 0.5 \ln[1 + 2 \times 10^{-5}(mn)^{0.75}]$
CFC-11	$F = 0.264(x - x_o)$
CFC-12	$F = 0.323(y - y_o)$

c , CO_2 (ppm); m , CH_4 (ppb); n , N_2O (ppb); x/y , CFC-11/12 (ppb).


1586



1587
1588 Fig. S2. Test of accuracy of 2-term approximation for forcing by the three gases.

1589 **SM2. Approximation for N₂O forcing**


1590 CO₂ and CH₄ are well-preserved in ice cores. However, the N₂O record is corrupted in some time
1591 intervals by chemical reactions with dust particles in the ice core. For such intervals we
1592 approximate the N₂O forcing by increasing the sum of CO₂ and CH₄ forcings by 12%, i.e., we
1593 approximate the forcing for all three gases as 1.12×[F(CO₂) + F(CH₄)]. The accuracy of this
1594 approximation is checked in Fig. S2 via computations for the past 132 ky, when data are
1595 available for all three gases from the multi-core composite of Schilt et al.⁵¹



1596
1597 Fig. S3. Climate forcings provided in current IPCC report¹³ for GHGs plus aerosols and for all
1598 human-made forcings, i.e., excluding only volcano and solar forcings.

1599 **SM3. Comparison of GHG + Aerosol forcing with All Human-Made forcing**

1600 IPCC all human-made forcings include land-use effects and contrails, which have large relative
1601 uncertainties. The forcings in Fig. S3 are those provided by IPCC (cf. Annex III of the current
1602 IPCC physical sciences report).¹³




1603
1604 Fig. S4. Surface temperature response to 2×CO₂ of GISS (2020) GCM (Sections 3).

1605 **SM4. Land warming vs. global warming: effect of polar amplification**

1606 Land areas usually have a larger response to a forcing as shown by the response in Fig. S4 of the
 1607 GISS (2020) GCM to 2×CO₂ forcing. The warming over land at latitudes 45°S to 35°N (2.62°C)
 1608 after 150 years (mean for years 101-200 is 18% larger than the global mean warming. However,
 1609 the equilibrium warming (3.52°C) of this low-latitude land is only 2% larger than global
 1610 warming (3.44°C), as a result of the polar amplification of global warming. This result indicates
 1611 that – for a case in which ice sheets are held fixed – the measurement of Seltzer *et al.*⁵⁶ of LGM
 1612 cooling of 5.8°C for land area 45°S-35°N is representative of the equilibrium temperature change
 1613 for a planet in which the ice sheets are held fixed, as polar amplification of temperature change
 1614 offsets the fact that land response to a forcing exceeds ocean response. Moreover, in the LGM
 1615 the real world, ice sheets were not fixed. Polar amplification of temperature change in the LGM,
 1616 compared to the Holocene, was substantially increased by the growth of ice sheets, as shown in
 1617 Fig. 9 of Hansen *et al.* (1984).⁷ Thus, the LGM global cooling would be substantially greater
 1618 than the 5.8°C cooling of land area 45°S-35°N.

1619 **SM5. CH₄ and N₂O forcings as percent of CO₂ forcing in Antarctic ice cores.**

1620 Based on the CO₂, CH₄ and N₂O amounts in the multi-ice core GHG tabulation of Schilt *et al.*⁵¹
 1621 for the past 140 ky, we calculated the ratio of CH₄ and N₂O forcings to the CO₂ forcing (Fig. S5).
 1622 The data cover a range of global temperature from the LGM minimum to the Eemian maximum.



1623 Fig. S5. CH₄ and N₂O radiative forcings as a percent of the CO₂ forcing in past 140 ky.
1624

1625 **SM6. Global warming in the pipeline: Green’s function calculations**

1626 Global warming in the pipeline (ΔT_{pl}) after a CO₂ doubling is the portion of the equilibrium
1627 response (T_{eq}) that remains to occur at time t , i.e., $\Delta T_{pl} = T_{eq} - T(t)$. If EEI were equivalent to a
1628 climate forcing, warming in the pipeline would be the product of EEI and climate sensitivity ($^{\circ}\text{C}$
1629 per W/m^2), i.e., warming in the pipeline would be $\text{EEI} \times \text{ECS}/4$, where we have approximated the
1630 $2 \times \text{CO}_2$ forcing as $4 \text{ W}/\text{m}^2$.


1631 Fig. S6 shows the $2 \times \text{CO}_2$ results for the GISS (2014) and GISS (2020) GCMs. EEI is not a good
1632 measure of the warming in the pipeline, especially for the newer GISS model. The warming in
1633 the pipeline for the GISS (2014) model is typically $\sim 30\%$ larger than implied by EEI and $\sim 90\%$
1634 larger in the GISS (2020) model. If these results are realistic, they suggest that reduction of the
1635 human-made climate forcing by an amount equal to EEI will leave a planet that is still pumping
1636 heat into the ocean at a substantial rate.

1637 Real-world climate forcing is added year-by-year with much of the GHG growth in recent years,
1638 which Fig. 4 suggests will limit the discrepancy between actual warming in the pipeline and that
1639 inferred from EEI. Thus, we also make Green’s function calculations of global temperature and
1640 EEI for 1750-2019 for GHG plus IPCC aerosol forcings. Green’s function calculations are
1641 useful, with a caveat noted below, for quantities for which the response is proportional to the
1642 forcing. We calculate $T_G(t)$ using Eq. (4) and $\text{EEI}_G(t)$ using

1643
$$\text{EEI}_G(t) = \int [1 - R_{\text{EEI}}(t)] \times [dF(t)/dt] dt, \tag{S1}$$


1644 where R_{EEI} (Fig. 5b) is the EEI response function (% of equilibrium response) and dF is forcing
1645 change per unit time. Integrations begin in 1750, when we assume Earth was in energy balance.

1646 The results (Fig. S7) show that the excess warming in the pipeline (excess over expectations
1647 based on EEI) is reduced to 15-20% for the GISS (2014) model, but it is still 70-80% for the
1648 GISS (2020) model. This topic thus seems to warrant further examination, but it is beyond the
1649 scope of our present paper.



1650
 1651 Fig. S6. Ratio of warming in the pipeline to EEI, $(T_{eq} - T)/EEI$, for the first 300 years after
 1652 instant doubling of CO_2 for (a) GISS(2014) model and (b) GISS 2020 model.

1653 The first matter to investigate is the cause of the ultrafast response of EEI (Fig. 5 of the main
 1654 paper), which could be done via the model diagnostics discussed in that section of our paper. If
 1655 the large difference between the EEI response functions of the two GISS models is related to
 1656 supercooled cloud water, Fig. 1 of Kelley *et al.* (2020)³⁴ suggests that the real-world effect may
 1657 fall between that of the two models. If the higher climate sensitivity of the GISS (2020) model is
 1658 related to this cloud water phase problem, more realistic treatment of the latter may yield a
 1659 climate sensitivity between that of the 2014 and 2020 models.



1660
 1661 Fig. S7. Ratio of warming in the pipeline to EEI, $(T_{eq} - T_G)/EEI_G$, in response to GHG and
 1662 IPCC aerosol forcing for the period 1750-2019 using the response functions for the GISS (2014)
 1663 model (left) and (b) GISS (2020) model (right).


1664 If real world climate sensitivity for $2\times CO_2$ is near $4^\circ C$ or higher, as we have concluded, the total
 1665 cloud feedback is likely to be even higher than that of the GISS (2020) model. We suggest that it
 1666 would be useful to calculate response functions for other models, especially models with high
 1667 climate sensitivity, to help analyze feedbacks and to allow inexpensive climate simulations for
 1668 arbitrary forcing scenarios. One major caveat: we have used a single response function calculated
 1669 for $2\times CO_2$. Especially in view of cloud feedbacks, it seems likely that the response function for

1670 aerosol forcing is different from that for CO₂ forcing, because most tropospheric aerosols exist
1671 well below the clouds. Much might be learned from calculating response functions for GHGs,
1672 tropospheric aerosols, stratospheric aerosols, and solar irradiance, for example.

1673 The response functions for global temperature and EEI, for both the 2014 and 2020 models,
1674 smoothed and unsmoothed, are available at <http://www.columbia.edu/~mhs119/ResponseFunctionTables/>


1675 **SM7. $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ data of Zachos and Westerhold and inferred sea level and T_{do}**

1676 Zachos and Westerhold $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ for the full Cenozoic, the Pleistocene, and past 800 thousand years
1677 are shown in Fig. S8, as well as the inferred sea level and T_{do} (sea level is compared to data of
1678 Rohling *et al.*¹⁰²).




1679

1680



1681
 1682 Fig. S8. Zachos and Westerhold $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ and inferred sea level and T_{do} for the full Cenozoic, the
 1683 Pleistocene, and the past 800 thousand years. Sea level data are from Rohling *et al.*¹⁰²



1684
 1685 Fig. S9. Surface temperature inferred from Zachos $\delta^{18}\text{O}$.

1686 **SM8. Global warming in the pipeline: Green's function calculations**

1687 Surface temperature (Fig. S9) from equations (14) and (15) using Zachos $\delta^{18}\text{O}$. Antarctic Dome
 1688 C temperatures⁴³ (red) relative to last 1,000 years are multiplied by 0.6 to account for polar
 1689 amplification and 14°C is added for absolute scale.

1690 **SM9. Communications from James Zachos and Thomas Westerhold**

1691 (1) Following is the 3 February 2023 response by Jim Zachos to a query by the first author (JEH)
1692 re Zachos' interpretation of the differences between the Westerhold and Zachos $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ data sets:

1693 There are two contributing factors that I am aware of. Because I was just stacking/averaging
1694 data across sites/basins, the only adjustment applied was for species vital effects (typically
1695 $<0.5\%$), in order to adjust to the "equilibrium" calcite values.

1696 The Westerhold curve/splice required adjusting each splice to the one above based on the overlap
1697 offset (+/-) between records (from different basins). Because this would be repeated with each
1698 splice, the effect is cumulative further back in time (see the [Westerhold] paper for the overlap
1699 adjustments). In the end, the thought was that the overlap adjustments would balance out.

1700 The PETM signal is large because the splice used for that interval was that of Site 1263, Walvis
1701 Ridge, which has an unusually large $d18\text{O}$ anomaly, almost double that of other pelagic sites.
1702 Why? Because it was relatively shallow (<1 km) and thus is capturing a shallow intermediate
1703 water signal which could be locally amplified with the introduction of warmer more saline
1704 waters (from a lower latitude source).

1705 The long-term T patterns and even with the orbital cycles are generally similar throughout the
1706 deep sea, but there are T gradients and thus regional differences in absolute T. This is the
1707 limitation of the mega splice for estimating mean ocean T.

1708 (2) Following are relevant excerpts (lightly edited for clarity) of a 2 June 2023 response of
1709 Thomas Westerhold to questions by the first author (JEH). First question: whether the Zachos
1710 data are more globally distributed and thus reflect more Antarctic Bottom Water conditions,
1711 while Westerhold data put more weight on North Atlantic Deep Water:

1712 Please look at Sampling Biases in the supplement:⁹⁸ For the 66 to 45 Ma part, it is interesting to
1713 note that $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ records from the Pacific Shatsky Rise Site 12209 and the Atlantic Walvis Ridge
1714 Sites 1262/1263 show a consistent pattern. The benthic record is a good monitor for the higher
1715 latitude temperature development, assuming that most deep water is formed in the high latitudes.
1716 Thus, it will be biased towards "polar" changes.

1717 Figure S13⁹⁸ gives a good idea how the "raw" data look before adjusting. For stitching the curve
1718 together, we had to correct for the isotopic offsets from different ocean basins. The Pacific
1719 Ocean is the largest ocean and probably best resembles a global mean, therefore all data were
1720 offset with respect to the equatorial Pacific values (Sites 1218, U1337, U1338; Fig. S14). One
1721 has to realize that single, continuous, individual high-resolution records for each of the different
1722 ocean basins and spanning the entire Cenozoic are unrealistic due to local sedimentation effects
1723 (gaps and condensed intervals) in available deep-sea sections.

1724 We took the Ceara Rise benthic stack of Wilkens et al. (2017) that stacks available data and is on
1725 an age model independent from isotope tuning. To compensate, the Ceara record as given in
1726 Table S33 was corrected $\delta^{18}\text{O} +0.45$ per mil; $\delta^{13}\text{C} -1.00$ per mil, Fig. S15, to make it consistent
1727 with U1337 from the equatorial Pacific.

1728 The Zachos data from EECO are a mix of high latitude data (Kerguelen Plateau, Maude Rise),
1729 mid latitude South Atlantic Walvis Ridge data and equatorial Pacific data (865 and 577), and
1730 Indian Ocean. The EECO data for CENOGRID come from Walvis Ridge Southeast Atlantic and
1731 Equatorial Atlantic Demerara Rise. Compared to Equatorial Pacific, those $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ are very similar
1732 (graph provided). Thus, I think the CENOGRID is a good general deep sea temperature indicator
1733 for the EECO.

1734 Zachos data are generally isotopically heavier, which could be because it is “old” data. We know
1735 for example that using a common acid bath is not so good to have reliable data for $\delta^{18}\text{O}$; those
1736 data are from Shackleton, for example. Since the use of Kiel devices, this issue is solved.

1737 Second question: whether a greater weight on North Atlantic Deep Water (which, more reliably
1738 than Antarctic Bottom Water, includes polar amplification of temperature change) may make the
1739 Westerhold data yield a more realistic estimate of Cenozoic temperature change?

1740 It is more realistic because the data are of much better quality using modern analytical
1741 techniques, however we do not know how much is ice volume and salinity effect, and pH change
1742 in the deep sea. Nele Meckler *et al.* (2022) just published a paper²³⁵ suggesting that temperature
1743 could be even higher in the deep ocean than given by $\delta^{18}\text{O}$.

1744 (3) Following is 10 July 2023 from Jim Zachos to JEH:

1745 Regarding the offset in the old Zachos stack and new Westerhold splice over the Paleogene, its
1746 most likely related to spatial biases in the Zachos stack with a considerably heavier weighting of
1747 data from the Southern Ocean sites (Kerguelen Plateau and Maud Rise). I was initially working
1748 on these sights for my own research in the 90’s, as my initial interests were largely on the
1749 climatic evolution of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. The splice data are largely from the
1750 Walvis Ridge and Shatsky Rise.

1751 Analytical biases? I am certain that the data generated from a common acid bath should not be
1752 systematically offset from the Kiel data. This is assuming that instrument-specific corrections are
1753 made using the carbonate standards of the NBS, which is the case in every lab.

1754 **DATA AVAILABILITY**

1755 "The data used to create the figures in this paper are available in the Zenodo repository,
1756 at [https://dx.doi.org/\[doi\]](https://dx.doi.org/[doi])."

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1779 Arndt, Jeffrey Miller, Morris Bradley and about 150 more contributors to annual appeals.

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